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LIST OF PARTIES
Appellants are Timothy J. Tabor, Deborah A. Tabor, and Farmers Insurance
Company.
The only Appellee before this Court is The Metal Ware Corporation, a
Wisconsin corporation. Other entities named in the U.S. District Court proceedings
include NESCO/American Harvest, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation, Newco of Two Rivers,
Inc., a Wisconsin corporation, and American Harvest, Inc., a Minnesota corporation.
NESCO/American Harvest, Inc., and Newco of Two Rivers, Inc., were Wisconsin entities
that were formed by Metal Ware to purchase assets from American Harvest, Inc., the
Minnesota corporation, which manufactured the product purchased by the Tabors.
Additionally, co-defendants in the U.S. District Court proceeding, ShopKo
and Englewood Electric, the retailer and wholesaler in the chain of distribution, have
settled and are no longer parties.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this certification of questions
of law from the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals appeal pursuant to Utah Code
§ 78-2-2(l)(2006).

CERTIFIED ISSUES
1.

Whether Utah would recognize an exception to the traditional rule of

non-liability of a successor entity to an asset purchase, or whether Utah will continue to
follow the majority rule by rejecting the non-traditional product line and continuity of
enterprise theories.
2a.

Whether Utah should create and impose an independent, post-sale

duty to warn on successor entities to an asset purchase requiring them to warn a customer
or owner of a product of defects in products manufactured by a predecessor entity.
2b.

If an independent duty to warn is imposed on a successor entity to an

asset purchase, whether Utah should follow the jurisdictions that impose a narrowlytailored independent duty to warn that arises only when the following standard is
satisfied: (1) there is a significant, continuing, independent relationship between the asset
purchase successor and the customer who owns and possesses the product; (2) the
relationship is a special one based upon substantial and meaningful contact; and (3) the
relationship developed as an independent one, based upon a business relationship that

1

developed exclusive of the asset purchase succession. Also, whether Utah should
consider the same factors considered by other jurisdictions in determining whether this
standard of an independent, special relationship exists between the asset purchase
successor and the customer or owner of the product, including, but not limited to: (1) the
asset purchase successor entity's succession to service contracts; (2) coverage of the
particular product possessed by the customer by a service contract; (3) actual service of
the product by the asset purchase successor; (4) the asset purchase successor's knowledge
of the defect; and (5) the asset purchase successor's knowledge of the customer's
location.
Because these issues are on certification from the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, and this Court answers the legal questions presented, and the preservation
requirement is inapplicable, and it is unnecessary to set forth a standard of review. See,
e.g., In re Kunz, 2004 UT 71, t 2 , 99 P.3d 793.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or
regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal. However, Sections 12
and 13 of Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts were noted by the Tenth Circuit in its
certification order, and may have a bearing on the Court's determination. These sections
are attached as Addenda "A" and "B," respectively.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter is before the Court on certification from the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals. Accordingly, the facts outlined in the certification order are adopted by this
court. See, Robert J. DeBry and Associates, P.C. v. Qwest Dex, Inc., 2006 UT 41, ^2,
P.3d_.
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
In 1996, the Tabors purchased a food dehydrator manufactured in 1995 by

American Harvest, Inc. Approximately one year later, in April 1997, Metal Ware entered
into an asset purchase agreement with American Harvest whereby Metal Ware purchased
certain American Harvest assets, but not liabilities—including products liabilities. Metal
Ware did not purchase all of American Harvest, through a stock trade or merger just
certain assets constituting select product lines, leaving American Harvest in operation.
Back in 1995, the United States Consumer Products Safety Commission instructed
American Harvest to issue a recall notice for the product, which it did. Thus, both the
recall and the purchase of the item by the Tabors took place well before Metal Ware
purchased any assets from American Harvest. As an asset purchase successor, Metal
Ware never possessed, designed, manufactured, sold, distributed, serviced, or had
anything at all to do with the Tabors' American Harvest product in question.
The Tabors allege that the American Harvest food dehydrator caused a fire
in their home. They sued American Harvest, ShopKo (retailer), Englewood (middleman),

3

and Metal Ware in strict products liability. The Complaint alleged that Metal Ware
actually distributed the product, but once the plaintiffs admitted in their depositions that
the product was purchased a year before Metal Ware had any involvement with American
Harvest, they changed their theory to one of successor liability, but never amended their
complaint to reflect those allegations. In short, successor liability was never pleaded on
this case.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS and DISPOSITION BELOW
Because it was not in the chain of distribution as a manufacturer or seller,

Metal Ware moved for summary judgment, claiming it owed no liability under any strict
products liability theory. The parties opposing the motion—the plaintiffs and codefendant ShopKo—advanced non-traditional theories for successor liability from other
jurisdictions. They claimed that the product line and continuity of enterprise theoriestheories adopted by only a very small minority of jurisdictions-imposed successor
liability on Metal Ware notwithstanding the fact that Metal Ware did not merge with
American Harvest, but instead purchased only certain select assets. The U.S. District
Court rejected the product line and continuity of enterprise theories, concluding that these
theories did not constitute Utah law, and that Utah courts would not adopt these theories
in the future. Because Metal Ware was not in the chain of distribution, the District Court
granted Metal Ware's motion for summary judgment in part.
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However, the U.S. District Court kept the case alive by allowing the
plaintiffs to proceed on an "independent failure to warn" theory, as discussed in Florom v.
Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570, 574 (10th Cir.1989), a case involving Colorado law, not Utah
law.1 Despite recognizing that "no Utah court appears to have acknowledged [a duty to
warn] in a successor corporation," the U.S. District Court imposed Colorado's
independent duty on Metal Ware, requiring it to warn "somebody." In imposing this
independent duty to warn "somebody," the U.S. District Court erred in concluding that
the independent duty was to warn the retailer (ShopKo), as opposed to the actual
customer who possessed the product (the Tabors).
Subsequently, Metal Ware filed another motion for summary judgment,
pointing out that: (1) the plaintiffs never pleaded an independent duty to warn claim in
their complaints, (2) that failure to warn was not the law in Utah, and (3) that even if it
were the law in Utah, given the undisputed facts, Metal Ware did not owe any such duty
to the Tabors. Metal Ware insisted that the independent duty to warn found in Colorado
law could not be applied here because the duty required an independent, ongoing special
relationship between Metal Ware (the successor to the manufacturer), and the ultimate
owner of the product (the Tabors). This independent, ongoing special relationship had to
be based upon substantial and meaningful contact between the successor and the product

1

The Tenth Circuit points out that "[t]he district court also relied on our decision
in Florom . . .However, because that case discussed Colorado, rather than Utah law, we
do not rely on it in this discussion." (Certification p. 5, fn. 3.)
5

owner. In fact, Florom and the other failure to warn cases make it clear that the
"customer" in the failure to warn context is the actual person or entity that owns the
machine and has the machine in his, her, or its possession, and not a middleman or
retailer.
No relationship of any kind ever existed between Metal Ware and the
Tabors. Metal Ware did not even know the Tabors existed until the Tabors filed their
lawsuit. Metal Ware had no idea the Tabors purchased a product from the predecessor
manufacturer, and had no idea where the product or the Tabors were located, making a
warning to them, even if required, impossible. Notwithstanding, the U.S. District Court
imposed an independent duty to warn on Metal Ware to warn the wholesalers and
retailers through whom the predecessor manufacturer sold the product before Metal Ware
purchased the assets of the manufacturer. The District Court noted at oral argument that
"Metal Ware had really no duty to warn [the Tabors]. They didn't know about them.
They had a duty to warn [ShopKo] perhaps." (Oral Argument transcript at 15:10-12,
Aplee. Supp. App. at 15.)
With the case set to go to trial on the sole theory of an independent duty to
warn only against Metal Ware (ShopKo and Englewood had settled out by then), the
deposition of the only ShopKo witness designated for trial, Ms. Shelley Schroeder, was
taken. Ms. Schroeder testified as follows: ShopKo had no information that the Tabors
were customers of ShopKo; ShopKo had no record that the Tabors purchased the product
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from a Utah ShopKo store as they claimed; ShopKo has written policies about how to
handle recalls, but no written policies for addressing a warning that would have come
after a product recall had already been issued and from an asset purchase successor; Ms.
Schroeder did not know what ShopKo would have done with a warning from Metal Ware
concerning the manufacturer's product because ShopKo has "never come across a
situation like that;" and Ms. Schroeder had no evidence or information that a "warning"
from Metal Ware would have actually resulted in a notice being posted in any Salt Lake
City area ShopKo store, much less the actual West Jordan store where the Tabors
purchased the American Harvest product more than a year before.
Following Ms. Schroeder's deposition, Metal Ware filed its final motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that there was no evidence of any causal connection
between the purported failure to warn and the occurrence of the fire. Given Ms.
Schroeder's testimony, the Appellants could not prove that any failure to warn by Metal
Ware in fact caused any injury, as the evidence showed that any warning given to ShopKo
would not have reached the Tabors. The jury would have been required to speculate to
find a causal link, and the U.S. District Court properly dismissed Metal Ware.
Appellants then appealed the dismissal of Metal Ware to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Metal Ware argued that the U.S. District Court correctly granted
summary judgment because there was no evidence that any failure to warn on Metal
Ware's part would have made any difference at all in this case. Irrespective of the fact
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that the independent duty to warn was erroneously imposed on Metal Ware to warn
ShopKo (a middleman), as opposed to the Tabors (the actual customer in possession of
the product), the plaintiffs still had no evidence that any warning to ShopKo would have
reached the Tabors, thus avoiding the fire.
Metal Ware also argued that the Tenth Circuit was entitled to affirm on the
alternate ground that Metal Ware owed no duty to the Tabors in the first place. As an
asset purchase successor to the manufacturer of the product, Metal Ware owed no duty to
the Tabors under the traditional rule of non-liability of an asset purchase successor.
Additionally, Metal Ware owed no independent duty to warn the Tabors inasmuch as it is
not the law in Utah, was not pleaded by the plaintiffs, and Metal Ware had no relationship
at all with the Tabors. In fact, Metal Ware did not even know the Tabors existed, much
less maintain an independent, special relationship with them through substantial and
meaningful contact.
Instead of holding that summary judgment was proper based on no evidence
of causation, and instead of concluding that Metal Ware owed no independent duty to
warn an unknown consumer of a defect in a product distributed by a predecessor
corporation to an asset purchase, the Tenth Circuit certified, on its own motion, two
questions to this Court.

8

FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

In 1995, the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission

("CPSC") issued a recall concerning certain food dehydrators manufactured and sold by
American Harvest, Inc., of Minnesota ("American Harvest"). (Aplt. App. at 117).
2.

The Tabors bought an American Harvest dehydrator from a Utah

ShopKo store in the summer of 1996. (Aplt. App. at 54).
3.

In April, 1997, Metal Ware purchased certain select assets, but not

liabilities (product liabilities were specifically excluded) from American Harvest by
means of an Asset Purchase Agreement. (Aplt. App. at 53).
4.

Thus, Metal Ware purchased certain assets from American Harvest

two years after the CPSC recall, and one year after the allegedly defective dehydrator was
already in the Tabors' home.
5.

Metal Ware moved for summary judgment in 2003, alleging that as a

successor entity following a pure asset purchase, it bore no liability for products
manufactured and sold by American Harvest. (Aplt. App. at 58).
6.

The U.S District Court recognized that there was "no evidence" that

Metal Ware was in the chain of distribution; Metal Ware did not manufacture, sell, or
distribute the Tabors' dehydrator. (Aplt. App. at 59.)
7.

Accordingly, the U.S. District Court entered an Order granting in

part Metal Ware's motion for summary judgment; the District Court dismissed all claims
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against Metal Ware as a non-distributor, but imposed a "claim for liability under a duty to
warn theory." (Aplt. App. at 53-68).
8.

The U.S District Court dismissed all claims except the "failure to

warn" claim because the evidence showed that Metal Ware did not distribute the item.
(Aplt. App. at 59, 68).
9.

The U.S. District Court also declined to recognize the non-traditional

product line and continuity of enterprise theories as Utah law, noting that "no published
Utah decision has hinted at adopting the two additional exceptions, much less done so,"
and stating that "neither the product line or continuity of enterprise theories has been
universally recognized in other states." Accordingly, no duty could be imposed on Metal
Ware based on these non-traditional theories. (Aplt. App. at 64-65, 68).
10.

The U.S. District Court further correctly noted that "no one has

argued that any of the four recognized exceptions to the general rule of successor
corporation non-liability applies in the present case," meaning that no duty could be
imposed on Metal Ware based on the traditional exceptions. (Aplt. App. at 64-65).
11.

Regarding the independent duty to warn theory, the U.S. District

Court even noted that "[ n ]° Utah Court. . . appears to have acknowledged such a duty
[to warn] in a successor company." (Aplt. App. at 65 n.7.)

10

12.

Notwithstanding that concession, the U.S. District Court allowed the

case to continue against Metal Ware on the independent duty to warn theory. (Aplt. App.
at 68).
13.

Subsequently, Metal Ware sought dismissal on the basis that (1)

plaintiffs never pleaded the failure to warn theory, (2) Utah law did not recognize the
failure to warn theory; and (3) even assuming the theory was recognized in Utah, Metal
Ware did not owe the independent duty to warn the Tabors under the circumstances of
this case. (Aplt. App. at 71-73).
14.

In addressing Metal Ware's claim that the plaintiffs never pleaded

the independent failure to warn theory in their complaints, the U.S. District Court
erroneously concluded that the pleading of generic strict products liability under
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402 A was the equivalent of pleading the independent
duty to warn owed by a successor. (Aplt. App. at 71-72).
15.

In addressing Metal Ware's claim that the failure to warn theory was

not Utah law, the U.S. District Court correctly noted that "no Utah court has ruled on this
specific issue," but then relied on Colorado law as found in Florom. (Aplt. App. at 7273).
16.

In addressing Metal Ware's argument that under the facts of this case

Metal Ware could not owe the independent duty to warn to the Tabors, the U.S. District
Court failed to acknowledge that Metal Ware pointed out that it could not owe the
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independent duty to the Tabors because it had no contact with the Tabors; Metal Ware did
not know who the Tabors were, and did not know the Tabors had purchased a dehydrator
from American Harvest, much less where the Tabors or the product were located. (See
Aplt. App. at 73-74; and Aplee. Supp. App. at 35, 40-42 (Metal Ware's Brief, Docket
Entry #104 at pp. 5,9-12).)
17.

At oral argument, the U.S. District Court conveyed its

misunderstanding of the duty to warn theory, stating t h a t " . . . Metal Ware had really no
duty to warn them [the Tabors]. They didn't know about them. They had a duty to warn
you [Shopko] perhaps." (See Transcript of Oral Argument at 15:10-12, Aplee. Supp.
App. at 15.)
18.

The U.S District Court further stated t h a t " . . . this isn't one of those

cases where, you know, although Shopko is involved, they're not going back and saying,
'well, yeah, but Metal Ware, you didn't warn us, so we couldn't pass it on . .. it's the
Tabors who are saying we should have been warned." (See Transcript of Oral Argument
at 28:24 to 29:4, Aplee. Supp. App. at 28-29.)
19.

In the end, in imposing the independent duty to warn, the U.S.

District Court improperly focused on the purported relationship between Metal Ware and
ShopKo, and the fact that Metal Ware continued to do business with ShopKo-a
"customer" of American Harvest-instead of focusing on the germane relationship
between Metal Ware and the Tabors, the owners of the product. (Aplt. App. at 74).
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20.

Accordingly, the U.S. District Court denied Metal Ware's request to

be dismissed, stating that "it appears that the relationship between Defendants and
American Harvest's customers was sufficient to impose a duty to warn on defendants."
(Aplt. App. at 76).
21.

Subsequently, plaintiffs identified Shelley Schroeder as the only

ShopKo representative to testify at trial. Mrs. Schroeder, ShopKo's Supervisor of Vendor
Compliance, is in charge of product recalls and vendor compliance concerning quality
and safety standards and procedures nationwide. (See Aplee. Supp. App. at 47-48 (Depo.
of Shelley Schroeder at 5:16-6:14; 8:6-9, Ex. A to Metal Ware's December 9, 2004
Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket Entry # 149).)
22.

In her deposition, Mrs. Schroeder gave the following critical

testimony:
a.

ShopKo has no information that the Tabors were customers of

ShopKo at all, much less that they had purchased the subject dehydrator from a
Utah ShopKo store. (Id. at 8:14-21, Aplee. Supp. App. at 48.)
b.

Mrs. Schroeder has never contacted or dealt with any of

ShopKo's Utah stores. (Id. at 15:11-15, Aplee. Supp. App. at 50.)
c.

She has never contacted Metal Ware about the CPSC recall

ShopKo was informed of or about any consumer complaints related to the
American Harvest dehydrators. (Id. at 16:20-24, Aplee. Supp. App. at 50.)
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d.

ShopKo has written policies about how to handle traditional

recalls, but no written policies or procedures for a "warning" like the one
suggested in this case. (Id. at 20:11-16, Aplee. Supp. App. at 51.)
e.

Mrs. Schroeder has never encountered, nor even heard of, a

situation like the instant case where a recall from a manufacturer occurs, the recall
is closed, and then a subsequent "warning" is given by anyone, much less a
successor to an asset purchase. (Id. at 29:23-30:5; 33:17-34:2, Aplee. Supp. App.
at 53-54.)
f.

She is not aware of any instances where a successor

corporation contacted ShopKo about safety concerns related to a product made by
that company's predecessor. (Id. at 34:16-23; 54:6-15, Aplee. Supp. App. at 55,
60.)
g.

She is aware of no cases in which ShopKo has ever posted

warnings or notices about a product safety issue outside of the context of a
traditional product recall. (Id. at 33:9-16; 39:12-22, Aplee. Supp. App. at 54, 59.)
h.

Specifically, in the situations where safety concerns were

raised outside of the traditional recall context, she is not aware of any case in
which ShopKo ever posted any form of warning or notice in any of its stores
anywhere. (Id., Aplee. Supp. App. at 54, 59.)

14

i.

She did not know w 1 "tat SI lopKo v 01 ild 1 ia\ e acti lalb done

with a "warning" from Metal Ware concerning American Harvest's dehydrators,
because ShopKo has "never come across a situation like that." (See Id. at 35:3-18,
A plee Si lpp \ pp • at 55 )
j.

She had no evidence that a "warning" from Metal Ware

would have actually resulted in a notice being posted in any Salt Lake City area

2J.

Given this undis:-./

*• •

l

>
• • •• .-. mnvrd lor

summary judgment on the grounds that the Plaintiffs lacked evidence to establish
causation under the only theory left, the independent duty to warn. (Aplt. App. at 119).
21

I letal i/ ' " ai c: pointed c I it tl lat gi\ c: t it .IV Is. S- :1 n: oeder's testin 101 \y , the

plaintiffs could not prove a causal link; they could not prove that any failure by Metal
Ware to warn ShopKo in fact caused the injury, and the jury would have to speculate to
fii id. a cai isal Hi ill ;: ( I \ i )
25.

Moreover, Metal Ware pointed out that the undisputed evidence w as

that any warning given to ShopKo by Metal Ware would not have reached the Tabors.
( \ j >lt

V[ >t > ; tl 1!. ( : 20).

26.

The U.S. District Court agreed, and dismissi d l\ letal W;mi beamse

the Tabors lacked sufficient facts to demonstrate that the alleged failure to warn was the
proximate cause of the fire. (Aplt. App. at 119-24).
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27.

The Tabors and Farmers appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of

Appeals, and after oral argument, the Tenth Circuit certified certain questions to this
Court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Utah should reject any exception to its current, traditional, general rule of
non-liability of a successor entity. The vast majority of jurisdictions have rejected
alternative theories of successor liability for many important reasons which spring from
the consensus that they are "unsound policy.2" Utah should continue to follow the
majority rule by rejecting the non-traditional product line and continuity of enterprise
theories.
Utah should not create and impose an independent duty to warn on
successor entities to an asset purchase to warn customers of defects in products
manufactured by predecessor entities. Utah products liability law already addresses
liability for entities within the chain of distribution of a product, see Ernest W. Hahn, Inc.
v.Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979) (adopting Section 402 A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts as Utah law, imposing strict products liability on "[o]ne who sells" a
product). For entities outside of the chain of distribution, Utah tort law already makes

2

The Tenth Circuit noted in is Certification that "[t[he drafters of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts expressly considered and rejected these new exceptions, noting that they
represent a minority view and are unsound policy." {See Certification p. 3, fn. 2)
16

clear that a special relationship i ni ist e xist bet w een pat ties befoi • = • a di it) i :t ia) be imposed,
especially when the alleged duty is based upon an alleged omission by the defendant, such
as a failure to warn. See Webb v. University of Utah 2005 UT 80, \ 9 125 P.3d 906.
Then i •; no tia il lii ni iilr jiii! iniposr >i in w iltilv in llliis < ase- especialI". \\ licit* llicre is no
relationship at all between the Tabors and Metal Ware, much less a special and
continuing one.
:

n independent duty to warn is to be imposed on successor entities to an

asset purchase, uian si;-, n lid follow the ji n isdictioi is tl mt ii i lpose a iiai i o vv lj tailoi e d
independent duty to warn that arises only when the following standard is satisfied: (1)
there is a significant, independent relationship between the asset purchase successor and
fttet ustomei nlh nwns niii possessr. III.; pit

itimi ,hip is n sp>t\;iciI one

based upon substantial and meaningful contact; and v3) the relationship developed as an
independent one, based upon a business relationship that developed exclusive of the asset
pi n c J lase si lccessioi I Factors to considei ii i determining whether this standard of an
independent, special relationship exists between the asset pi ircl iase si lccessoi ai id tl ic:
customer < >r o\v tu-: »f the product include, but are not limited to: (1) the asset purchase
successor

H -v's succession to service contracts; (2) coverage of the particular product

possessed by the customer by a service contract; (JJ

' service of tl le pi odi ict I: ] - tl le

asset purchase successor; (4) the asset purchase successor's knowledge of the defect; and
(5) the asset purchase successor's knowledge of the customer's locatioi i In the instant

17

case, no independent duty to warn could be imposed because there was no relationship at
all between Metal Ware and the Tabors.
ARGUMENT
I.

Utah Has Never Recognized an Exception to the Traditional Rule of NonLiability of a Successor Entity to an Asset Purchase, and Utah Should
Continue to Follow its Prior Precedent, Which is the Majority Rule, and
Continue to Reject the Non-Traditional Product Line and Continuity of
Enterprise Theories.
The Tenth Circuit has asked this court to determine whether Utah would

adopt any non-traditional theory regarding successor liability. The Certification reads: "If
Utah law would extend successor liability to Metal Ware merely because (1) it purchased
American Harvest's assets, and (2) it continued selling the product line of food
dehydrators, then the Tabors may have a claim against Metal Ware. On the other hand, if
Utah recognizes only the standard four exceptions to successor non-liability, the district
court properly granted summary judgment." (Certification at p. 6.)
A.

Traditional Rule of No Successor Liability to an Asset Purchaser
The Tenth Circuit correctly noted that "[t]he general rule is that a successor

corporation is not responsible for the torts of a predecessor entity." (Certification p. 4).
This traditional rule of successor liability and its four exceptions are set forth in The
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 12 (2003). Section 12 provides:
A successor corporation or other business entity that acquires assets of a
predecessor corporation or other business entity is subject to liability for
harm to persons or property caused by a defective product sold or otherwise
distributed commercially by the predecessor if the acquisition:
18

(a) is accompanied by an agreement \\n Iht ,\w\ ci -mil to ns^um*1 sin h
liability; or
(b) results from a fraudulent conveyance to escape liability for the debts or
liabilities of the predecessor; or
(c) constitutes a consolidation or merger with the predecessor; or
(d) results in the successor becoming a continuation of the predecessor.
Id.
The Tenth Circuit also correct!] noted tl lat' " ' 1 1 ic: • I Itah Coi u I: of \ppeals 1 las
recognized this general rule of successor nonliability, subject to four exceptions."
(* emilcationp. 4 .) I hat is,
[W]here one company sells or otherwise transfers all its assets
to another company the latter is not responsible for the debts
and liabilities of the transferor except where: (1) the purchaser
expressly or impliedly agrees to assume such debts; (2) the
transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the seller
and purchaser; (3) the purchasing corporation is merely a
continuation of the selling corporation; or (4) the transaction
is entered into fraudulently in order to escape liability for such
debts.
Maoris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, In.

1999 IJT App 2 3 0 , 1 1 5 , 986 P.2d 748, 752. The

general 11lie of successor nonliability has been confirmed to be the km r
as 2004. See Decius v. Action Collect > ;

. /» ,. /i/<

^

.•

TTf

nh as recently

. • J*

956. In Decius, the Utah Court of Appeals held that "Utah has not ventured past the
traditional bounds oi (he mere continuation test/' id. at f 10, and that the mere
continuation exception "deni;t i ul'i \i i uiiiinun nknlih ul slm k, tlnt't lui, .iml slockliuld* t ,
and the existence of only one corporation at the completion of the transfer." Id. The
court expressly "decline[d] to expand successor liability" where there was no continuing
owners:! rip by tl ic sz it t ic shai el ic »ldei s of tl ic old company in the new company Id. at f 18.
19

The U.S. District Court properly determined that "no published Utah
decision has hinted at adopting the two additional exceptions [product line and
continuity], much less done so." (Aplt. App. at 65, Order at p. 13.) That ruling was made
by the U.S. District court before Decius was issued, which explicitly rejected the
continuity of enterprise exception and reaffirmed adherence to the general rule of
nonliability. Thus, it is even clearer now, after Decius, that the majority, traditional rule
is the law in Utah and should remain so.
Utah law has never held that an entity that purchases the assets of anther
entity is liable for injuries caused by defects in a product sold or manufactured by the
asset selling predecessor. The great majority of other jurisdictions also follow this
longstanding, traditional rule. See, e.g, Leannis v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439
(7th Cir. 1977) ("The general rule in the majority of American jurisdictions . . . is that a
corporation which purchases the assets of another corporation does not succeed to the
liabilities of the selling corporation.").
In the instant case, none of the four (4) Maoris exceptions was ever raised
in the U.S. District Court. Instead, plaintiffs and co-defendants ShopKo and Englewood
Electric proposed that Utah should or would adopt the non-traditional product line or
continuity of enterprise theories. For reasons more fully described below, the traditional
rule of Maoris and its four (4) exceptions are preferable to the non-traditional product line
and continuity of enterprise exceptions which most jurisdiction have explicitly rejected.

20

The Tenth Circuit notes that despite tl le aforei nei it ioi led state of ( Itah h t < , tl le '' I aboi s
nonetheless argue that Utah courts would expand liability to include Metal Ware since it
continued to sell American Harvest's dehydrator products." (Certification p. 5.)
B.
The product line theory posits that where one entity a c q u i r e
substantially all of the assets of another entity and continues to undertake essentially the
same manufacturing operation as the selling entity, the purchasing entity is liable in strict
products liabilit) r lot tin 1 iii|mi<"i \

JUM

d In, lln

(IHMIIIH I III.IIIIII.IC

hirnl in • nld In inlic

predecessor entity. See 63 A m J u r . 3 d Products Liability § 138 (1997). The Tenth Circuit
asks i his court whether Utah would adopt the product line theory, stating as follows; "If
* i CM ild extei id successoi liabilit) to f letal Vi 7 are i nerel> becai ise (1) it pui cl lased
American Harvest's assets, and (2) it continued selling the product line of food
dehydrators, then the Tabors may have a claim against Metal Ware On the other hand, if
I Itah i ecognizes oi ily tl te stai icic u d four exceptions to successor non liability, the district
court properly granted summary judgment." (Certificatioi i atp.6 ) I I'tal i si ioi ild reject 1:1 le
product line theory just as the majority of other jurisdictions have rejected it.
Since the product line theory was first adopted in California, see Ray v.
Alad Corp., 560 P.22d 3 (Cal. 1977), oni\
those jurisdictions have placed important limits on the theory. 3 i111 other jurisdictions

3

These states are: New Jersey (Ramirez v. AmstedIndus.,
21

431 A.2d 811 (N.J.

have adhered to the general rule of Section 12 of the Restatement, and have rejected both
the product line and continuity of enterprise exceptions when given the opportunity.4

1981); (but see possible limit to "product line" exception recognized in dicta in Leo v.
Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 37 F.3d 96, 100-01 (3d Cir.1994) (applying New Jersey law)
("It seems apparent that, except perhaps in design defect cases, a defect in a product when
the manufacturer distributed the product is likely to manifest itself and cause injury within
a reasonable time after the product is manufactured. Accordingly, as a practical matter,
successor liability under Ramirez is likely to be imposed in most cases, if at all, for a
limited period.")); New Mexico (Garcia v. Coe Manufacturing Co., 933 P.2d 243 (N.M.
1997)); Pennsylvania (Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1981)); Washington (Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash.1984)).
4

See, e.g., Arkansas (Swayze v. A.O. Smith Corp., 694 F.Supp. 619, 623 (E.D.
Ark. 1988)); Reed v. Armstrong Cork Co., 577 F. Supp. 246, 247- 48 (E.D. Ark. 1983));
Colorado (Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying Colorado
law); Johnston v. AmstedIndus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992)("The
vast majority have declined to [adopt the product line theory]")); Florida (Bernard v. Kee
Mfg. Co., 409 So.2d 1047 (Fla. 1982)); Georgia (Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 328
S.E.2d 726 (Ga. 1985)); Illinois (Gonzalez v. Rock Wool Eng'g & Equip. Co., 453 N.E.2d
792 (111. App. Ct. 1983)); Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 395 N.E.2d 19 (111. App. Ct.
1979)); Iowa (Pancratz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1996)); Kentucky
(Conn v. Fales Div. ofMathewson Corp., 835 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying
Kentucky law)), Pearson v. Nat'I Feeding Systems, Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 51-52 (Ky. 2002)
(citing eleven jurisdictions rejecting the product line theory); Maryland (Nissen Corp. v.
Miller, 594 A.2d 564 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991)); Massachusetts (Guzman v.
MRM/Elgin, 567 N.E. 2d 929 (Mass. 1991)("[t]he majority of State courts that have
addressed the product line theory have declined to adopt it," and citing cases));
Minnesota (Costello v. Unipress Corp., 1996 WL 106215 (Minn. Ct. App., Mar. 12,
1996); Cooper v. LakewoodEngineering & Mfg. Co., 45 F.3d 243 (8th Cir. 1995)
(applying Minnesota law)); Missouri (Bozell v.H&R 1871, Inc., 916 F.Supp. 951 (E.D.
Mo. 1996)); Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers Southeast, Inc., 849 F.2d 341, 343 (8th Cir. 1988)
(applying Missouri law)); Nebraska (Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d
481 (Neb. 1982)); North Carolina (Budd Tire Corp. v. Pierce Tire Co., Inc., 370 S.E.2d
267 (N.C. Ct. App.1988)); North Dakota (Downtowner Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc.,
347 N.W.2d 118 (N.D.I984)); Ohio (Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Co., 617 N.E. 2d 1129
(Ohio 1993)); Oklahoma (Goucher v. Parmac, Inc., 694 P.2d 953 (Okla.Ct.App.1984));
South Dakota (Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mack, Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515 (S.D. 1986));
22

The traditional mlr <>l IIHUIII Imhililv In in .ihiH pinch,isr sue cessoi i«,
founded on the longstanding rule of products liability law that only one w ho
manufactures, sells, or distributes a product is liable for a product defect. See
Restatement ( I fulfill m!l flu 1 .i\\ of 1 oil' I'MMIIU ( I mhililv ^ I J unl. a ( I'J'W), see also
Bernard v. KeeMfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 1982) (holding that "extending
liability to the corporate successor is not consistent with at least one major premise of
strict liability, which is to place responsibility for a defective product on the manufacturer
who p lac ed tl mt pi c cii ict int : : oi i lmerce") ^ si iccessoi has not in ' it sd I isage of tl le
product or implied its safety, it has not created the risk, and it has never been in a position
to eliminate the risk. Thus, because an asset purchase successor like Metal Ware never
munul.'U'linnl sold ar (lisdnlmilril (he (lefediu* ptodiu I I lie assel purchase successor is
not liable in strict products liability.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability §12, cint b., discusses
varioi is compelling reasons for the general i tile set forth n i Macri s. "I linking liability of
successor corporations to tin* < in utitsfaiuvs desetibei 1 in ("inlioti 1 ", | is Niippoilul In

Texas (Griggs v. CapitolMach. Works, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985);
Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co., 709 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)); Vermont
(Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126 (Vt. 1984)); Virginia (Harris v. T.I., Inc.,
413 S.E.2d 605 (Va. 1992)); West Virginia (Jordan v. Ravenswood Aluminum Corp.,
455 S.E.2d 561 (W. Va. 1995) (per curiam)); Wisconsin (Fish v. AmstedIndus., Inc., 376
N.W.2d 820 (Wis. 1985)); District of Columbia (LeSane v. Hillenbrand Indus., 791 F.
Supp. 871, 873-74 (D. D.C. 1992) (applying District of Columbia law)); Virgin Islands
(Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1986, V. I.)).
23

fairness and efficiency considerations." Id. "[IJmposing liability on the piecemeal
purchase of productive assets would, for no compelling reason, impede the free
alienability of corporate assets, thereby discouraging shareholder investment of capital
and increasing social costs." Id. "Extending successor liability beyond the [four
exceptions to the general rule] would, in the judgment of most courts, be unfair and
socially wasteful." Id. This is so because "the imposition of strict liability on [asset
purchase] successor corporations is inconsistent with the principle of products liability
law that imposes responsibility on the party who created the risk and was in a position to
prevent its occurrence." Id.
Moreover, a majority of courts have concluded that the
substantial social costs of a more expansive liability rale
would be incurred without actually benefitting very many tort
plaintiffs. In most instances, the magnitude of future liability
for products distributed pre-transfer is difficult, if not
impossible, to assess. As a majority of courts have
recognized, the result of imposing successor liability as a
general rule would be to depress the prices for transferred
assets to the point that piecemeal disposition of assets, which
clearly would not subject the buyers to liability, would be a
preferable alternative to the sale of assets as part of a going
concern. In that event, the products liability claimant harmed
by a pre-transfer product defect would still run the risk of
ending up with an uncollectible judgment. The benefits to
society of preserving predecessor's assets as a going concern
would be sacrificed, with no commensurate benefits to tort
claimants.
* * *

And even if a more expansive successor liability rule did not
invariably lead to piecemeal asset transfers, such a liability
rule would depress the prices received for going-concern
transfers to an extent that would threaten to undermine the
24

o:

:

*

- iing corpoi atioi is
* * *

A more expansive successor liability rule might threaten
shareholders' investments by significantly restraining
corporate assets transfers, thereby tending to frustrate
corporation law's objective of encouraging shareholder
investment.
Id.
Some courts have recognized that imposition of successor liability on small
corporations who acquire assets through asset purchases could spell financial disaster for
tl v'i i vr/«* i*

.

So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Ma. i^i)

. : MI tu. ^ec utsi, iscnitu,: . ALL MJg. ( - - '
vsmall

businesses;

\

,••:-. M . .i

annihilation"), The traditional rule of non-liability benefits society as a whole. The
traditional rule "derives primarily from the law governing corporations, which favors the
free alienability of coi poi ate assets at id lit nits si mi eholdei s' exposures to liability in order
to facilitate the formation and investment of capital." Restatement, § 12, cmt. a.
In view of the foregoing, "[s]everal courts and commentators have
* • * M Mini

• • - ems set "forth | in Ihc I Restatement commentary] can best be

addressed by legislation." Id., Reporters' Note, cmt. b. kauoiu«

«•• >-"

^ n it

quotes two leading cases on this issue, Fish v. AmstedIndus., Inc., 376 N.W .2d 820 (Wis.
1985), and Leannis v. Cincinnati, Inc.. ^ i
legislative appn >ac 11. 111 /• Vs // , I1 in • '• •

M>
- • -1

j

0 7 7 \ which support the
-

.:

-•e

legislature is in a better position to make broad public policy decisions in actions based on
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products liability law." Fish, 376 N.W.2d at 829. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
likewise concluded that because "courts are ill-equipped . . . to balance equities among
future plaintiffs and defendants . . . such broad public policy issues are best handled by
legislatures with their comprehensive machinery for public input and debate." Leannis,
565 F.2d at 441. Finally, in the recent case of Winsor v. Glasswerks PHXt LLC, 63 P.3d
1040 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003), the court refused to adopt either product line or continuity of
enterprise, and set forth four reasons why the legislature is better equipped to address
such issues: (1) the "core issue is one of policy," (2) predictability in commerce should
be encouraged, (3) the exceptions "modify or minimize fundamental principles of tort
liability," and (4) "our present rule already allows for liability against certain successor
corporations." Ttf. at 1047-1050.
In sum, judicial opinions generally articulate six (6) reasons for rejecting
the non-traditional theories: First, whether the long-standing rule of successor nonliability should altered by changing the law regarding corporate succession is better left to
the Legislature. Second, the successor corporation that purchased the predecessor's
assets did not realize the profit for the product. Third, the successor corporation cannot
be said to have created the risk presented by the product because it did not manufacture
the product. Fourth, the successor corporation is unable to improve the defective product
that was already sold into the market by the predecessor corporation. Fifth, the successor
corporation did not represent that the product was non-defective and safe by selling the
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negotiated and paid for the goodwill or reputation of the predecessor's product line, and
to hold the successor liable for defects in products manufactured by the predecessor
would IK: lorcing the successor to pay twice lor the goodwill of the predecessor. See, e.g.,
Pearson, 90 S W 3d 46, 51 52 (K y 2002); h mes t ' h 4m s : m "\ fi u iune & 1 >res s C t > :, 320
N.W.2d 481, 484 (Neb. 1982) (discussing five reasons for rejecting the product line and
continuity of enterprise theories); Fish ^ 7 ^ N W.2d at 827-28; Johnston, 830 P.2d at
1 ;

w •

*

i

I 1 1 4, 5 ( f l Cir ) (1 :

,

ILK

•

and Indiana would reject the theories).
Utah should continue to follow the majority rule and reject both the product
line and continuity of enterprise exceptions. It is noteworthy that Appellants abandoned
their prodi ict lii le argi iments on appeal to till ic ' I ei ith Cii ci lit ' I I

:; tl leoi ) is

unavailing to them for that reason as well. Notwithstanding their acknowledgment that
the theory is unavailing to them, because this case is before this Court on certification,
tl lis ( " >nn shoi ild still i i lake it cleai tl tat tl le pi odi ict lii le tl le orj is i lot tl le la'vv ii I 1 1 tall i

^

"Continuity of Enterprise" Theory
Most courts address the continuity of enterprise theory in conjunction wi tli

tl ic pi odi i ::t lii ic tl ieor>

; Vltl ton igl i

tl ic ' I abot s otil> raised tl le coi itini lit) of enterprise

theory on appeal, because courts often give the same reasons for rejecting tlic t\\ o
theories, the reasons for rejecting the continuity of enterprise theory are the same reasons

27

for rejecting the product line theory. See e.g, Fish v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 376 N.W.2d
820, 829 (Wis. 1985) ("We decline to adopt the 'expanded continuation' exception to
nonliability for the same reasons that we declined to adopt the product line exception/')
Instead of arguing the traditional Macris exceptions to the U.S. District
Court, the plaintiffs argued the continuity of enterprise theory. The U.S. District Court
correctly held that Metal Ware cannot be liable under either the product line or continuity
of enterprise theory because Utah has never adopted either theory as Utah law. This
Court should make it clear that Utah rejects the continuity of enterprise theory, as has
already been suggested by the Utah Court of Appeals in both Macris and Decius. The
same reasons given above for rejecting the product line theory also constitute valid
reasons for rejecting the continuity of enterprise theory. See Restatement (Third) of the
Law of Torts, Product Liability § 12 cmt. a, cmt. b, and Reporters' Note, cmt. b.
Rationale (1998); see also, Pearson, 90 S.W.3d 46, 51-52 (Ky. 2002); Jones v. Johnson
Machine & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Neb. 1982) (discussing reasons for rejecting
the product line and continuity of enterprise theories); Wins or v. Glasswerks PHX, LLC,
63 P.3d 1040, 1046-1050 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Fish, 376 N.W.2d at 827-28; Johnston,
830 P.2d at 1144; Guzman, 567 N.E.2d at 931.
Utah has never adopted the continuity of enterprise or product line theory.
Indeed, the district court noted that "no published Utah decision has hinted at adopting
the two additional exceptions [of product line and continuity of enterprise], much less
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enterprise theory w a s actually rejected by the Utah Court of Appeals. See Decius v.
Action Collection

Service, Inc., 2004 U T A p p 484, 105 P.3d 956. Because the continuity

o f i T i l n p n s r (hettiy is hul I l|,ih L n , llic I I N hi ;(rii I I \\\w\ piopeilv i c j a l a l il and
declined to apply it to impose a duty on Metal W a r e . See Tucker, 645 F.2d at 624-1S
(citing Leannis,

565 F.2d at 439, for the proposition that a federal court should not

impose the law of one state upon another). Moreover, the I I S . District Court correctly

chance.
r

As noted above, after the U . S . District Court held that the continuit
enterpi ise tl leoi y vv as i i ::)t tl le la ><. \ • ii i.
Action Collection

•

Appeals issued Decius v.

Service, Inc., 2004 U1 A p r 484, IOD K J d ^DO, Iejecting the contini iit>

of enterprise theory. In Decius, the Utah Court of Appeals reiterated that \ i.i!i follows
the traditional rule of successor non-liability and the traditional exceptions. 2004 U T App
484 at. 'Tf8, 105 I * 3d 956

I lie « : :»'i n t expi essly stated tl mt'" I ftal 11 n is not vei iti ired f: i ist tl :t i

traditional bounds of the mere continuation test." Id. at \ . J. It then discussed the
continuity of enterprise theory. The Utah Court of Appeals pointed out that "[o]nly a
n nil IOI il:y of ji ii isdictioi is 1 la/v e adopted tl ic [coi itii n iit> of ei iterpi ise tl leory ]
Fish v. AmstedIndustries,

;

Inc., 376 N . W . 2 d 820, 828 (Wis. 1985), for the proposition that

the legislature is better suited to change the law of successor liability. Decius, 2004 U T
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App 484 atfflf8-15,105 P.3d 956. In the end, Decius expressly "decline[d] to expand
successor liability." Id. at f 18.
In sum, the U.S. District Court correctly noted that neither the continuity of
enterprise theory nor the product line theory are the law in Utah, as "no published Utah
decision ha[d] hinted at adopting the two additional exceptions [of product line and
continuity of enterprise], much less done so." (Order, Docket Entry #98 at p. 13).
Subsequent to that ruling by the U.S. District Court in this case, Utah explicitly and
affirmatively rejected the continuity of enterprise theory in Decius. This Court should
continue to follow the majority rule and simply make it clear that Utah would not adopt
the continuity of enterprise theory.

II.

Utah Law Should Not Impose an Independent Duty to Warn on a Successor
to an Asset Purchase.
As set forth above, Utah has continued to follow the general rule of

non-liability of a successor to an asset purchase. To date, Utah has never adopted an
independent failure to warn theory, and there is no need to create such a tort now. A
decision to expand or modify products liability law is better left to the legislature given
the broad policy implication and the possible ramifications that such a change may have
on other areas of the law. This is discussed in Section II. A. below.
Even if this Court were to adopt a theory imposing an independent duty to
warn on a successor entities, such a duty should only arise in very narrow
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circumstances-none of which would create the duty in this case Other ji n isdictioi is tl iiat
have adopted the independent duty to warn on an asset purchase successor impose the
duty in narrow circumstances where there is an independent, special relationship between

this three-part standard, five factors are considered in other jurisdictions. The three-part
standard and five factors used in considering this standard are discussed in Section II.B
below.
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There is no need for this Court to create the tort of an independent duty to
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Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820, 829 (Wis. 1985). (discussing better option of legislative change to
products liability laws in context of product line and continuity of enterprise theories); see
itlso Lctmnis

v. Cincinnati,

hu , Mo V .1<\ 4 V , 111 1 ' 1 'n I1) >"«) (same). As the

Restatement commentary explains, courts are ill eqi lipped to ei ' all late ai id balance tl ic:
ramifications that changes to products liability law will have on corporate law and other
IN HIK DI law therefore this issue is best handled by the legislature with its ability to
invite public input and debate. Restate! 1 ic: 1. it ( 1 1 lit d) of tl: ic I -aw of 1 01 ts §12, R epoi tci s'
Note, cmt. b. Rationale
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Judicially creating the independent duty to warn theory in Utah is also
unnecessary given longstanding Utah law that a special relationship is necessary to
impose a duty. Utah products liability law imposes strict liability upon manufacturers,
wholesalers, and retailers in the chain of distribution. See Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v.Armco
Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979) (adopting Section 402 A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts as Utah law, and imposing strict products liability on "[o]ne who sells" a
product); Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-1 to -7 (2006) (outlining statutory modifications and
additions to Utah products liability law). Existing Utah tort law also addresses whether
an independent duty to warn is owed by entities outside of the chain of distributionbased upon whether a special relationship exists.
Utah law is already clear that "[t]he law imposes upon one party an
affirmative duty to act only when certain special relationships exist between the parties."
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986). Moreover, a special
relationship must exist when the alleged duty is based upon an alleged omission by the
defendant, such as a failure to warn. See Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, ^f 910, 125 P.3d 906. ("[A]n omission or failure to act can generally give rise to [a duty]
only in the presence of some external circumstance-a special relationship).
Because Utah law is already clear that a duty exists only if a special
relationship exists between two parties, it is unnecessary to judicially create an
independent duty to warn in this circumstance involving an alleged failure to warn by an
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asset purchase successor to a possessor of a product. Because products liability applies to
those in the chain of distribution, and Metal Ware is not in the chain of distribution,
products liability need not apply. Instead, general tort law applies. Utah tort law already
addresses this requirement of a special relationship before a duty may be imposed. There
is no need to judicially create a new tort for this circumstance.
It would also be imprudent to attempt to set forth all the contours and
nuances of such an independent duty to warn in the abstract. Whether a special
relationship exists must be considered on a case by case basis. In this case there was no
relationship at all between the asset purchase successor (Metal Ware) and the customers
who purchased the product from the predecessor and possessed the product (the Tabors).
Certainly the Court can declare that no duty exists in this circumstance where there was
no relationship between the asset purchase successor and possessor of the product.
However, this Court should not attempt to outline, in the abstract, all of the factors and
circumstances by which an asset purchase successor would owe a duty of care to a
customer of a predecessor manufacturer in possession of a product manufactured by that
predecessor. It would be more prudent to declare that no duty exists in this case where
there is no relationship, and then allow the common law to develop as other cases and
factual scenarios present themselves.
Utah would not be the first jurisdiction to decline to adopt the independent
duty to warn in the context of a consumer product. See Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive
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Corp., 78 Cal. App.4th 681, 695, 697-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) ("[w]e reject plaintiffs1
theory of independent liability [under the independent duty to warn theory], and stating
that even if the court were "inclined to [adopt the theory as California law], it is not
warranted in the circumstances of this case.") (citing Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857,
866 (9th Cir.1980) ("surmisfing] that. . . California law imposes no duty to warn under
[similar] circumstances" involving a consumer pharmaceutical drug).
There is especially no need to create an independent duty to warn where an
individual injured by a product already has recourse against entities within the chain of
distribution. Where a plaintiff has no recourse because no entity within the chain of
distribution is a viable party, the independent duty to warn has more appeal. However, in
cases like the instant case where entities within the chain of distribution are viable parties,
and the plaintiff has obtained, through settlement, recourse from a wholesaler and retailer
who sold the product, there is no need to impose a duty on an entity that is not part of the
chain of distribution.
B.

Analytical Framework for the Independent Duty to Warn
If this Court decides to create and impose an independent duty to warn on

post-sale asset purchases, it should consider both the standard and factors set forth by
other jurisdictions. The jurisdictions that have imposed an independent duty to warn on a
successor to an asset purchase have articulated the following standard: in order to impose
an independent duty to warn, there must be an independent, special relationship between
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the asset purchase successor and the customer or owner of the product - the person with
possession of the product. See, e.g., Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 84 (3d Cir.
1986); Gee, 615 F.2d at 866; see also Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605, 610 (Va. 1992);
see generally 63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 138 (1997).
In understanding the duty, it is important to understand the three elements
of the standard: (1) the relevant relationship - between the actual owner or possessor of
the product and the asset purchase successor; (2) whether this relationship is a special one
as determined by whether there is substantial and meaningful contact; (3) whether the
relationship has developed as an independent one, based upon a business relationship that
has developed exclusive of the asset purchase succession. These three elements of the
standard are discussed in Section II.B.l.
Other jurisdictions have set forth five factors to consider in analyzing the
standard and determining whether an independent, special relationship exists between the
asset purchase successor and the customer or owner of the product: (1) the asset purchase
successor entity's succession to service contracts; (2) coverage of the particular product
possessed by the customer by a service contract; (3) actual service of the product by the
asset purchase successor; (4) the asset purchase successor's knowledge of the defect; and
(5) the asset purchase successor's knowledge of the customer's location. Harris, 413
at 610; Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570, 577 (10th Cir. 1989); Niccum v. Hydra Tool
Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn.1989); Wessinger v. Vetter Corp., 685 F. Supp.769,
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774 (D. Kan. 1987); Stratton v. Garveylnt'l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290, 1296 (Kan. Ct. App.
1984); Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc^ 347 N.W.2d 118,125 (N.D. 1984)
Gonzalez v. Rock Wool Engineering and Equip. Co., Inc^ 453 N.E.2d 792, 795 (111. Ct.
App. 1983); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977); Leannais, 565 F.2d at
442; see generally 63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 139 (1997). These factors are
discussed in Section II.B.2.
1.

Three-Part Standard for Imposing an Independent Duty to Warn
a.

The relevant relationship is with the actual owner or possessor of
the product, not a retailer or wholesaler that sold the product

The relevant special relationship is between the successor entity and the
owner who possesses the product, not between the successor entity and a business
customer such as a retailer or wholesaler that sold the product to the possessor. This
special relationship must be a direct and continuing relationship with the possessor of the
product.
This first element of identifying the relevant relationship is critical in a
consumer product case like the instant one. In a case involving a consumer product, the
Ninth Circuit explained the nature of this independent, special relationship that must exist
between the successor entity and the owner or purchaser of the product. In Gee v.
Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1980), predecessors manufactured and distributed a
drug. Id. at 860. An asset purchase successor entity became aware of the drug's tendency
to cause disease. Id. at 865. The family of an injured user of the drug claimed an
36

independent duty to warn. Id. at 866. The court held that no independent duty to warn
was owed by the successor to the end consumer - the actual person in possession of the
drug. The court noted that "[a] common thread running through decisions imposing a
duty to warn upon a successor corporation has been the continuation of the relationship
between the successor and the customers of the predecessor." Id. The successor owed no
duty to warn because "[t]here [were] no facts in the record to indicate that [any successor
entity] had any relationship with users of [the drug]." Id. at 866.
Other cases involving consumer products agree that the pertinent
relationship is between the asset purchase successor and the actual possessor of the
product, as opposed to between the asset purchase successor and business customers who
are wholesalers or other pass-through distributors who are no longer in possession of the
product. See Wessinger v. Vetter Corp., 685 F. Supp. 769, 770 (D. Kan. 1987) (holding
no independent duty to warn in case involving consumer motorcycle part where asset
purchase successor offered to provide service and maintenance to retail sellers who were
business customers of both manufacturer and then asset purchase successor; no duty to
warn was owed because the asset purchase successor "merely supplied retailers, not retail
customers, with replacement parts and repair kits[, and] there was no indication that [the
manufacturer] had a relationship with retail customers, that [the asset purchase successor
maintained the relationship or began its own relationship as to customers in general[.])"
(emphasis added); Tracey v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 745 F. Supp. 1099, 1111-
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1113 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (explaining in context of defective shotgun that succession by asset
purchase alone does not impose an independent duty to warn, "emphasizing] that the
relationship which gives rise to this duty is between the successor corporation and the
particular allegedly defective product/' and holding that no duty to warn was owed
because even though the asset purchase successor performed maintenance on the model
of shotgun involved and provided spare parts for that model, there was "no evidence that
[asset purchase successors] performed service on the particular shotgun involved in this
case or that defendants were aware of the location of the shotgun or the location of its
owner").
Nearly all of the cases discussing the independent duty to warn involve
industrial machinery. Only a handful of cases involve consumer goods. As a result, the
independent duty to warn theory is tailored to the factual circumstances involving the sale
and purchase of industrial machinery through an asset purchase, followed by a continued
service relationship on that specific machine. The theory is less congruent to
circumstances like the instant case involving consumer goods, where a product is
purchased by a consumer through a chain of distribution involving a manufacturer,
wholesaler, and retailer; and instead of having a personal relationship between the owner
or possessor of the product, the asset purchaser has a business relationship with the
companies in the chain of distribution.
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Some courts fail to make clear this aspect of the independent duty to
warn-i.e., that the relevant relationship is between the successor entity and the owner who
possesses the product, and not between the successor entity and a business customer such
as a retailer or wholesaler that sold the product to the ultimate consumer or possessor.
Some courts genetically state that the duty exists if there is an independent relationship
developed by the asset purchase successor with the "customers" of the predecessor. The
case of Patton v. TIC United Corp., 11 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 1996), uses the following
more accurate language: "The Kansas high court recognized that a manufacturer's postsale duty to warn ultimate consumers who purchased the product who can be readily
identified or traced ...." Id. at 1239 (emphasis added; internal quotation omitted). In
the "Certification of Questions of State Law" in the instant case, the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals correctly focuses on the relevant "customer" of the predecessor by its multiple
references to "product owners" and "consumers" when discussing the post-sale duty to
warn. {See Certification pp. 8-9; emphasis added).
Thus, the duty to warn, if it were to be adopted, runs to the ultimate
consumer as opposed to a wholesaler or retailer. Any continued business relationship
with middlemen or retailers also utilized by with the predecessor is "[m]ere casual
contact" between the successor entity and the clients of the manufacturer, and is
insufficient to impose the duty. Harris, 413 S.E.2d at 610; see also Patton at 1240.
While some courts might fail to make the relevant relationship clear, many courts have
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explained that communications and contacts with distributors are insufficient to establish
the type of special relationship necessary to impose an independent duty to warn. See
Kaleta v. Whittaker Corp., 583 N.E.2d 567, 574-75 (111. Ct. App. 1991); Wessinger, 685
F. Supp. at 770-71; Tracey, 745 F. Supp. at 1100-02. For the reasons explained above,
this is because such communications relate to the wrong relationship.
In this case there was no relationship at all between the asset purchase
successor (Metal Ware) and the customer that owned and possessed the product (the
Tabors). Metal Ware never contacted the product owner, and had no idea the Tabors
existed at all, much less that they owned any American Harvest product. The relevant
relationship is between Metal Ware and the Tabors; and there was no relationship.
Hence, no duty would arise in this case even if the independent duty to warn was the law
in Utah.
b.

A "special" relationship requires substantial and meaningful contact
The relevant relationship between the customer and successor entity must

also be "special," not a relationship that exists simply because wholesalers and retailers
continue to do business after the asset purchase. The independent, special relationship
should arise only in narrow circumstances when there is substantial and meaningful
contact between the successor entity and the owner or purchaser of the product. Harris,
413 at 610; Polius, 802 F.2d at 84. This relationship between the product owner and
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successor entity must be significant enough to impose an independent duty based upon a
new, independent relationship between them.
Courts have noted various circumstances that are insufficient to constitute
substantial or meaningful contact or a special relationship. First, mere knowledge by an
asset purchase successor of a defect in its predecessor's product does not establish the
special relationship and result in a duty to warn. See Tucker v. Paxson Mack Co., 645
F.2d 620, 621-27 (8th Cir. 1981) (concluding no independent duty to warn because the
bare assertion that successor knew of the defective nature of the product and its location
did not show the necessary relationship); Chadwick v. Air Reduction Co., Inc., 239 F.
Supp. 247, 249-50 (N.D. Ohio 1965); see also Tracey, 745 F. Supp. at 1100-02. Second,
the duty also does not arise merely because an asset purchase successor conducts the same
business activity with the predecessor's customer. See Harris, 413 S.E.2d 605 at 610.
"[T]he mere continuation of a name and acquisition of good will" is insufficient to
impose an independent duty to warn, Travis, 565 F.2d at 448; see also Geef 615 F.2d at
866, cited in Florom, 867 F.2d at 577 (explaining that succession alone does not impose a
duty to warn.) In other words, the continuity of business by retailers and wholesalers with
the asset purchase successors is insufficient. To impose an independent duty to warn
based upon succession would swallow the general rule of successor non-liability.
Clearly in this case, where there was no relationship at all between Metal
Ware and the Tabors, there was obviously no a "special" and "continuing" relationship.
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However, even if a service call had been made to the Tabors by Metal Ware, some
jurisdictions would still conclude that this was insufficient. See Travis, 565 F.2d at 44549 (holding no duty because no special relationship existed where employee of successor
made a service call on owner, but this did not create the requisite "ongoing or continuous"
special relationship); Kaleta, 583 N.E.2d at 574-75 (holding no duty because there was
"no evidence of a continuing relationship between [successor] and [purchaser and owner
of the product] with respect to servicing the 660 line of beltloaders," even where
successor notified owner it would honor the manufacturer's warranty and told owner to
relay any problems it had with product, because "such communications and contacts alone
fail to constitute evidence of a continuing relationship between [the product owner and
the successor]/')
c.

The relationship must be independent of the asset purchase

This special relationship must also be an independent relationship that
exists based upon a business relationship exclusive of the asset purchase succession.
Without an independent, special, ongoing relationship based upon substantial and
meaningful contact between the successor and the owner of the product, the duty to warn
would arise in any circumstance in which a successor has any dealings with its
predecessor's customers. See e.g. Stratton v. Garvey Int'l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290, 1296
(Kan. Ct. App. 1984) "There must be some basis in such a relationship of benefit to the
successor entity and solid connection with the predecessor entity. Were it not so, a duty
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to warn would arise in which a successor has any dealings with its predecessor's
customers." id.; see also Jacobs v. Lakewood Aircraft Service, Inc., 512 F.Supp. 176
(E.D.Pa. 1981).
2.

Factors Considered by Courts in Analyzing Whether the
Standard is Satisfied

Jurisdictions that have imposed the independent duty to warn evaluate a list
of factors, some of which are congruent with this case involving a consumer product, and
some of which are not. These factors include the following: (1) the asset purchase
successor entity's succession to service contracts; (2) coverage of the customer's
allegedly defective product by a service contract; (3) actual service of the product by the
asset purchase successor; (4) the asset purchase successor's knowledge of the defect; and
(5) the asset purchase successor's knowledge of the customer's location. Harris, 413
S.E.2d at 610; Florom, 867 F.2d at 577; Wessinger, 685 F. Supp.at 774; Stratton, 676
P.2d at 1296; Gonzalez, 453 N.E.2d at 795; Travis, 565 F.2d at 448.
As noted previously, these factors are applicable in cases involving
industrial or manufacturing products that are sold through an asset purchase, and less
congruent to cases like the instant one involving a consumer product. The independent
duty to warn should be narrowly tailored and the application of these factors results in the
independent duty to warn occurring in narrow circumstances. Some courts have gone so
far as to hold that where the asset purchase successor never provided service to the actual
defective product itself, no independent duty to warn existed. See, e.g., Harris, 413
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S.E.2d at 610 ("[c]ourts in jurisdictions that recognize the duty to warn have
overwhelmingly rejected claims based upon the duty when there is no service obligation
or there has been no actual service of the product."); J & B Co. v. Bellanca Aircraft
Corp., 911 F.2d 152, 154 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that where the product was never
serviced by the asset purchase successor that there could be no liability under the
independent duty to warn theory as a matter of law). Even one jurisdiction that adopted
the continuity of enterprise theory construes the independent duty to warn narrowly. See
Pelc v. Bendix Machine Tool Corp., 314 N.W.2d 614, 621 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). That
case explained that succession to an asset purchase alone is insufficient to impose the
independent duty to warn, and held that where a successor to an asset purchase knew
machine existed, but did not know of the defect and never serviced the machine, there
was no independent duty to warn. Id. See also Foster v. Cone-BlanchardMach. Co.,
597 N.W.2d 506, 512-13 (Mich. 1999) (holding no duty because no special relationship
existed between successor and predecessor's customers where there was "no evidence
that [the successor entity] actually or by agreement serviced the machine in question,"
despite the fact that successor had access to predecessor's customer lists and successor
may have solicited continuing business from predecessor's customers); Again, if this
independent duty were not narrowly tailored, the duty to warn would arise in any
circumstance in which a successor has any dealings with its predecessor's customers. See
Stratton v. Garvey Int'l Inc., 676 P.2d 1290, 1296 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984). At least one
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other jurisdiction that adopted the liberal theories is not liberal in imposing the
independent duty to warn on successor entities, but only impose the duty in narrow
circumstances. Jacobs, 512 F.Supp. at 178-86 (holding no duty where there was no
evidence that successor "ever serviced or repaired a tip tank that had been manufactured
by the [predecessor]/' even though successor had contact with customers of predecessor
for questions or spare parts, this casual contact was insufficient to create the special
relationship, because if this were the case "a duty to warn would arise in any circumstance
in which a successor has any dealings with the predecessor's customers"); Tracey, 745 F.
Supp. at 1100-02 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
The above-illustrated factors are not the ultimate test, but a framework for
analyzing the ultimate standard: whether there is a special, independent relationship
based upon substantial and meaningful contact between the successor and the owner of
the product - the actual possessor of the product - sufficient to impose an independent
duty to warn. See, e.g., Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118,
125 (N.D. 1984).
Finally, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly notes that if the
independent duty to warn is to be imposed at all, the defects for which a warning would
be required must be "recently discovered." Florom at 577. Such a requirement means that
Metal Ware would have no liability in this case because the defect was not "recently
discovered," but rather was known well before the 1997 asset purchase, and had even
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been the subject of a Consumer Products Safety Commission recall in 1995. The Tenth
Circuit indicates its disapproval of the application of the duty to Metal Ware when it
notes that the U.S. District Court held that Utah law would impose the duty "even though
(1) American Harvest was aware of the defect before it sold the dehydrator to the tabors
and (2) the USCPSC had imposed a recall obligation on American Harvest." See
Certification p. 6.5
While it is the role of this Court to answer the certified questions and not
apply the law to the facts of this case and decide this case, the end result should be that
Metal Ware owes no duty. The particular machine owned by the Tabors was never under
a service obligation, and it was never serviced by Metal Ware. Metal Ware had no idea
the Tabors had purchased any American Harvest product, and also did not know where
the product was located. Moreover, the defect was clearly not "recently discovered," but
rather was well known many years before, and was the subject of a USCPSC recall,
meaning that a "warning" had already been given about the product during the recall
process. Given these facts, the independent duty to warn should not have been imposed
on Metal Ware.

5

The Tenth Circuit correctly notes that the U.S. District Court "did not address
whether the defect should be considered "recently-discovered," thereby triggering a duty
to warn." Certification at p. 7.
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CONCLUSION
Utah should continue to adhere to the traditional, majority rule as set forth
in Maoris. Both of the minority, non-traditional exceptions are ill-conceived and cause
far greater problems than they would remedy. Additionally, the independent duty to warn
should not be adopted, but even if it is it should be narrowly tailored as it has been in
other jurisdictions. Irrespective of the outcome of any of the certified questions, Metal
Ware was properly dismissed by the U.S. District Court.
Dated this 26th day of September, 2006.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

Brian C. Webber
Attorneys for The Metal Ware Corporation
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Chapter 3. Liability Of Successors And Apparent Manufacturers
§ 12. Liability Of Successor For Harm Caused By Defective Products Sold
Commercially By Predecessor
Link to Case Citations
A successor corporation or other business entity that acquires assets of a
predecessor corporation or other business entity is subject to liability for harm
to persons or property caused by a defective product sold or otherwise distributed
commercially by the predecessor if the acquisition:
(a) is accompanied by an agreement for the successor to assume such
liability; or
(b) results from a fraudulent conveyance to escape liability for the debts
or liabilities of the predecessor; or
(c) constitutes a consolidation or merger with the predecessor; or
(d) results in the successor becoming a continuation of the predecessor.
Comment:

a. HistoryThe rule that a corporation or other business entity is not, in the
absence of the circumstances described in Subsections (a) through (d), subject to
liability for harm caused by defective products sold by a corporation from which
it purchases productive assets derives from both products liability and corporate
law principles. When the alleged successor purchases the assets piecemeal with
little or no further continuity of operations between the two corporations or
other business entities, the nonliability of the alleged successor derives
primarily from the fact that the successor is not within the basic liability rule
in § 1 of this Restatement: "one ... who sells
or distributes
a defective product
is subject to liability for harm ... caused by the defective product." (Emphasis
added.) Thus, when one corporation commercially sells products, some of which are
defective, and later transfers its productive assets to another corporation that
uses those assets to manufacture products of its own, the purchaser of the assets
is not liable for harm caused by a defective product sold earlier by the
transferor because the transferee did not "sell or distribute" the defective
2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 12 (1998)
product that caused the harm. When the alleged successor receives value in the
form of the transferor's goodwill and continues to manufacture products of the
same sort as manufactured earlier by the predecessor, and thus to some extent
constitutes a continuation of the predecessor, the general rule of nonliability
derives primarily from the law governing corporations, which favors the free
alienability of corporate assets and limits shareholders' exposures to liability
in order to facilitate the formation and investment of capital.
When the transferor goes out of business upon, or shortly after, a transfer of
productive assets, the rights of plaintiffs injured by defective products sold
earlier by the transferor may be adversely affected. For tort plaintiffs who have
existing judgments outstanding against the predecessor at the time of transfer and
dissolution, the law governing corporations and other business entities provides,
within limits, legal protection. Creditors, including tort creditors, who hold
existing judgments against a corporation that is in the process of transferring
its assets and going out of business may satisfy those claims out of the proceeds
from the transfer of assets. Moreover, if the proceeds from the transfer of assets
are distributed to shareholders of the transferor corporation in violation of
applicable state corporation law or fraudulent transfer law, existing creditors of
the corporation may pursue the proceeds in the hands of the transferor's
shareholders. These rules, in some states expressed in statutes, are designed to
protect, within the limits of practicality, creditors who are identifiable at the
time of the transfer of the predecessor's assets to the successor corporation and
the transferor's dissolution. The same principles have been applied to the
transfer of assets of proprietorships, partnerships, and other business entities.
Tort claimants who, as a result of defective products sold by a predecessor
corporation, seek recovery only after transfer of assets to a successor
corporation often face difficulties in attempting to bring their claims within the
foregoing legal rules. Their claims typically accrue after the predecessor
corporation has lawfully distributed to its shareholders the proceeds from the
transfer of assets and has ceased to exist. Under these circumstances, tort
claimants who were not existing creditors at the time of the transfer of assets
ordinarily have no recourse against the predecessor's shareholders. Unless they
can pursue their claims against the successor corporation, or can reach other
funds provided by existing insurance or by a statute, their only practical remedy
lies with retailers and wholesalers in the predecessor's distributive chain, who
may not be available as a practical matter. Statutes and judicial precedents
governing the rights of creditors after a corporate assets transfer and
dissolution generally do not address this problem of post-transfer claims accrual.
Few precedents recognize tort claims against the successor corporation for harm
caused by defective products sold by the predecessor unless the transaction by
which productive assets are acquired meets criteria established by one of several
traditional exceptions. These exceptions apply generally to creditors whose claims
accrue after dissolution of the predecessor, and are not limited to products
liability claimants. They fall into two basic categories: those in which some
conduct of the successor, in addition to acquiring the predecessor's assets,
justifies holding the successor responsible (the successor either contractually
agrees to be liable or knowingly participates in a fraudulent asset transfer); and
those in which the successor itself can be said to have sold or distributed the
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defective products because the successor constitutes the same juridical entity as
the predecessor, perhaps in somewhat different form (the successor merges with, or
constitutes a "mere continuation" of, the predecessor). Under this Section, a
products liability claimant has a recognized claim against a successor for harm
caused by defective products distributed by the predecessor in these circumstances.

A minority of jurisdictions impose liability on a successor corporation based
on a broader concept of continuation of the business enterprise, even when there
is no continuity of shareholders, officers, or directors. Some courts hold that
the continuation of a predecessor's product line by the successor is sufficient to
support imposition of successor liability for harm caused by defects in products
sold before the assets transfer.
b. Rationale.
Limiting the liability of successor corporations to the
circumstances described in this Section is supported by fairness and efficiency
considerations. An alleged successor that purchases the predecessor's productive
assets piecemeal, other than as part of a going concern, cannot, by that fact
alone, be said to have either manufactured or sold defective products distributed
by the predecessor before the transfer of assets. In the absence of circumstances
in which the successor could be said to constitute a continuation of the
predecessor, or somehow to have prejudiced subsequent tort plaintiffs by its own
pre-acquisition conduct, imposing liability on a business entity that did not make
or distribute the defective products that caused harm could be justified only
because it increases the amount of money available post-acquisition out of which
to satisfy plaintiffs' claims. But that alone cannot be justification for
successor liability. Thus, imposing liability on the piecemeal purchase of
productive assets would, for no compelling reason, impede the free alienability of
corporate assets, thereby discouraging shareholder investment of capital and
increasing social costs.
Imposing liability on successor corporations constitutes acceptable public
policy when the successor either agrees to be liable or is implicated in the
transfer of assets in a way that, without such liability, would unfairly deprive
future products liability plaintiffs of the remedies that would otherwise have
been available against the predecessor. Subsections (a) through (d) describe the
types of corporate asset transfers that have been determined to justify imposing
liability on the successor. Subsection (a) recognizes that contractual promises by
the successor to pay subsequent tort claims, for which promises the successor has
presumably been compensated, should be honored. Subsection (b) provides that when
a business entity makes a fraudulent transfer in which the transferee is
implicated, successor liability is appropriate for the same reason that liability
would be imposed in favor of other creditors. Thus, a predecessor may arrange an
asset transfer at an artificially deflated price, accompanied by an agreement by
the successor to compensate either the predecessor, its owners, or its managers in
ways that escape easy detection; or a successor may knowingly participate in an
asset transfer coupled with a liquidating dividend by the predecessor to its
shareholders for the purpose of leaving tort plaintiffs without remedy. If those
transfers are fraudulent under applicable state law, imposing tort liability on
the transferee for having knowingly participated in such transfers is justified.
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Subsections (c) and (d) deal with successors that, in a real sense, did produce
and distribute the product that caused the harm, though in a somewhat different
organizational form. Subsection (c) deals with the transferor corporation that
merges by law or in fact into the transferee, typically with no substantial change
in corporate management or ownership. Subsection (d) concerns the transfer of
corporate assets in the context of a transaction involving only a change in
organizational form. In both these situations, liability for harm caused by
defective products distributed previously should be imposed on the business entity
that emerges from the transaction. In substance, if not in form, the post-transfer
entity distributed the defective products and should be held responsible for them.
If mere changes in form were allowed to control substance, corporations intending
to continue operations could periodically wash themselves clean of potential
liability at practically zero cost, in sham transactions, and thereby unreasonably
undermine incentives for producers and distributors to invest in product safety
and unfairly deny tort plaintiffs adequate remedies when defective products later
cause harm.
A small minority of courts have fashioned successor liability rules more
advantageous to products liability claimants than the rules stated in this
Section. Those minority rules, in effect, extend the "change in form only"
exception just described to include circumstances in which the successor continues
a product line previously distributed by the predecessor. The minority position is
based on the belief that a successor who purchases productive assets should not be
allowed to benefit from receiving the goodwill and reputation of the predecessor's
business without the burden of responding in tort to claims for harm caused by
products sold by the predecessor prior to transfer. An argument advanced to
support this minority view is that holding successors liable reduces the price
that predecessors receive for transferring assets, thereby helping to strengthen
incentives for the managers to invest in care before the transfer of the business.
This reasoning has proven unpersuasive to a substantial majority of courts that
have considered the issue. Extending successor liability beyond the exceptions set
forth in Subsections (a) through (d) would, in the judgment of most courts, be
unfair and socially wasteful. Post-transfer plaintiffs harmed by pre-transfer
defects have a right to expect that a transfer of assets will not be allowed to
prejudice financially their chances of satisfying a judgment; they have no
legitimate claim that the transfer should increase those chances over what they
would have been if no transfer had occurred. In the likely event that the
successor is financially stronger than the predecessor, imposing a broader
liability for pre-transfer product defects would unjustifiably increase the funds
available to those injured by such defects compared with what would have been
available to them if no transfer had taken place.
As courts have recognized, it would be difficult, and often impossible, to
implement and administer a liability rule that attempted to limit post-transfer
plaintiffs' rights to an aggregate amount equal to the net value of the
predecessor before transfer. Tort judgments are imposed independently of one
another, in various jurisdictions; no central authority exists to assure that, in
the aggregate, tort judgments do not exceed a predetermined total amount. Thus,
the expanded successor liability rules in a minority of states, not limited to
time-of-transfer net value, replace one risk of injustice--that the assets
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Page 5

REST 3d TORTS-PL § 12
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 12 (1998)

transfer may unfairly reduce plaintiffs* recoveries in cases that do not satisfy
the traditional exceptions (reflected in Subsections (a) through (d))-- with
another, possibly greater, injustice: that the transfer may give tort plaintiffs a
windfall at the expense of companies who engage in asset transfers and, in turn,
at the expense of the consuming public.
Moreover, a majority of courts have concluded that the substantial social costs
of a more expansive liability rule would be incurred without actually benefiting
very many tort plaintiffs. In most instances, the magnitude of future liability
for products distributed pre-transfer is difficult, if not impossible, to assess.
As a majority of courts have recognized, the result of imposing successor
liability as a general rule would be to depress the prices for transferred assets
to the point that piecemeal disposition of assets, which clearly would not subject
the buyers to liability, would be a preferable alternative to sale of the assets
as part of a going concern. In that event, the products liability claimant harmed
by a pre-transfer product defect would still run the risk of ending up with an
uncollectible judgment. The benefits to society of preserving the predecessor's
assets as a going concern would be sacrificed, with no commensurate benefits to
tort claimants.
And even if a more expansive successor liability rule did not invariably lead
to piecemeal asset transfers, such a liability rule would depress the prices
received for going-concern transfers to an extent that would threaten to undermine
the objectives of the law governing corporations. One of the purposes served by
the corporate structure is to provide limitation and certainty of risk to
shareholders in order to encourage capital formation. Thus, the shareholders'
initial risk is limited to the value of their shares of stock and they are able to
withdraw from an investment by sale of the stock without incurring future
potential liability. A more expansive successor liability rule might threaten
shareholders' investments by significantly restraining corporate assets transfers,
thereby tending to frustrate corporation law's objective of encouraging
shareholder investment.
Some critics of the majority rule argue that, when the successor continues to
manufacture the same products as the predecessor, often under the same trademark,
consumers have legitimate expectations that the successor will stand behind the
predecessor's products. Disappointing these expectations is unfair, according to
the critics, quite apart from the effects of successor liability upon the
formation of capital. But this argument overlooks the reality that the
predecessor's products that cause harm in these cases were distributed prior to
the assets transfer, when there could be no reliance by consumers on the financial
viability of the successor. One cannot logically rely on post-transfer
expectations regarding the successor to justify the imposition of liability on the
successor for pre-transfer distributions by the predecessor.

c. Nonliability

in the absence

of special

circumstances.

circumstances described in Subsections (a) through
buys productive assets from another company is not
defective product sold or otherwise distributed by
successor's acquisition of assets. When the assets
alleged successor did not "sell or distribute" the

In the absence of the

(d), a successor company that
liable for harm caused by a
the predecessor prior to the
are purchased piecemeal, the
product under the liability
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rule stated in § 1; and attempts to establish continuation of the corporate entity
are recognized only under the terms set forth in this Section. The successor is
liable under §§ 1-4 for harm caused by defective products it sells after
acquisition. In the absence of the circumstances described in this Section,
however, the successor is not liable for defective products sold by another prior
to that time.
Illustrations:
1. ABC Corp., which manufactures and sells lawn mowers, transfers all its
assets to XYZ Corp., a manufacturing corporation with different officers,
directors, and shareholders, for cash. ABC then dissolves, distributing the
proceeds of the sale to its shareholders. ABC complies with all statutes
governing its dissolution, and none of the exceptions in this Section applies.
XYZ retains most of ABC's employees and managers and continues to manufacture
lawn mowers, some of which are the same as previously manufactured by ABC. A
defective lawn mower made and distributed by ABC prior to the transfer of
assets to XYZ harms a user three years after the transfer. XYZ is not subject
to liability for the harm to the user of the lawn mower.
2. The same facts as Illustration 1, except that a defective lawn mower made
and distributed by XYZ after the transfer of assets harms a user three years
after the transfer. XYZ is subject to liability for the harm to the user of the
lawn mower.
d. Agreement for successor to assume liability.
When the successor agrees to
assume liabilities for defective products sold by its predecessor, liability is
imposed under Subsection (a) in accordance with the terms of the agreement. As a
general matter, contract law governs the application of this exception. Courts
have interpreted general statements that the successor agrees to assume the
liabilities of the predecessor to include products liability claims even though
the agreement makes no specific mention of products liability. However, assumption
of products liability is not implied by the successor's assumption of specific
duties with regard to product service or replacement.
Illustration:
3. The same facts as Illustration 1, except that the transfer-of-assets
agreement contains a promise by XYZ to assume all of ABC's liabilities. XYZ is
subject to liability for the harm to the user of the lawn mower.
e. Fraudulent transfer in order to avoid debts or liabilities.
Subsection (b)
incorporates by reference the relevant state law governing fraudulent conveyances
and transfers. In contexts other than successor products liability, fraudulent
transfers can be set aside on behalf of existing creditors of the transferor. In
this context, fraudulent transfers provide a basis for holding successors liable
to post-transfer tort plaintiffs. The fact that general creditors are pursuing
remedies against the transferee does not prevent tort plaintiffs from pursuing
remedies under Subsection (b). What constitutes a fraudulent conveyance or
transfer is determined by reference to applicable state law.
Illustration:
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4. The same facts as in Illustration 1, except that the transfer of
assets by ABC to XYZ is made as part of a plan between ABC and XYZ to leave
tort claimants harmed by ABC's defective products without enforceable remedies.
If a transaction constitutes a fraudulent transfer under applicable state law,
XYZ is subject to liability for harm to the user of the lawn mower.
f. Consolidation
or merger.
When statutory consolidation or merger of two
corporations takes place, products liability devolves on the successor corporation
under Subsection (c). A more difficult question is whether, absent statutory
merger, a de facto merger has taken place. Local law governing de facto mergers is
determinative. Whether a de facto merger under Subsection (c) has occurred
generally depends on whether: (1) there is a continuity of management, employees,
location, and assets; (2) the successor corporation acquires the assets of the
predecessor with shares of its own stock so that shareholders of the transferor
corporation become shareholders of the transferee corporation; (3) the predecessor
corporation ceases its ordinary business operations immediately or shortly after
the transfer of assets; and (4) the successor assumes those liabilities and
obligations of the predecessor necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of the
normal operations of the predecessor.
Illustrations:
5. The same facts as Illustration 1, except that the transfer of assets is
for stock in XYZ and constitutes a statutory merger of ABC and XYZ under
applicable state law. XYZ is subject to liability to the user of the lawn mower.
6. The same facts as Illustration 1, except that the transfer of assets is
for stock in XYZ, with which ABC redeems its own stock from its shareholders.
ABC then ceases to operate its own business, which XYZ resumes with the same
management and employees, at the same location. If it is determined under
applicable state law that a de facto merger between ABC and XYZ has occurred,
XYZ is subject to liability for harm to the user of the lawn mower.
g. Continuation
of the predecessor.
The exception recognized in Subsection (d) ,
referred to by many courts as the "mere continuation" exception, applies when
there has been a formal redesignation of the predecessor corporate entity but
little or no change in underlying substance. The most important indicia of
continuation, in addition to the continuation of the predecessor's business
activities, are common identities of officers, directors, and shareholders in the
predecessor and successor corporations. A minority of jurisdictions recognize a
broader exception, referred to as the "continuity of enterprise" exception, that
imposes liability on the successor for continuing the business activities of the
predecessor even when the corporate form of the successor is different from the
predecessor. This Section does not follow that minority position.
Illustration:
7. The same facts as Illustration 1, except that XYZ is a corporation with
the same officers, directors, and shareholders as ABC. After the assets
transfer, XYZ continues the same manufacturing and distribution operations as
ABC did previously. If XYZ is determined to constitute a "mere continuation" of
ABC under Subsection (d), XYZ is subject to liability to the user of the lawn
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mower.

h. Necessity

for

the predecessor

to transfer

all

of its

assets

and go out of

business.
Almost all of the reported decisions applying the bases of successor
liability stated in this Section involve predecessors that transfer all of their
assets to successors and then dissolve or otherwise cease operations. Indeed, the
predecessor's termination is the circumstance that, as a practical matter, most
often gives rise to the need for a post-transfer tort plaintiff to look to the
successor for recovery. The exceptions set forth in Subsections (c) and (d),
merger and continuation, most frequently have significance when the predecessor
has transferred all of its assets to the successor and, at least formally, has
ceased to exist. But there is no reason that the exceptions set forth in
Subsections (c) and (d) might not arise in connection with the transfer of a
division of a large company, leaving the company in existence after the transfer.
And the exceptions in Subsections (a) and (b) could arise in connection with
transfers involving less than all of the predecessor's assets where the
predecessor continues in existence after the transfer.

i. Relationship

between

the rule

in this

Section

and the

successor's

independent
duty to warn. This Section deals with a successor's liability for harm
caused by the predecessor's defective products and is not premised on
post-transfer wrongdoing by the successor itself. For the rules governing the
liability of a successor for its own post-transfer failure to warn its
predecessor's customers, see § 13.
REPORTERS' NOTE
Comment b. Rationale.
In a much-cited case, Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802
F.2d 75 (3d Cir.1986) (applying Virgin Islands law), the court stated that the
imposition of successor liability on a company that has merely purchased the
assets of a predecessor for cash and does not otherwise fall within the stated
exceptions would encourage the dissolution of a financially troubled corporation
by piecemeal sale of assets rather than as a going business concern. In this event
the plaintiff would not be able to reach the assets when the accident occurred
years after dissolution. The end result would be the needless destruction of an
ongoing business enterprise with no net advantage to anyone. Other courts have
observed that the imposition of successor liability on small corporations could
spell financial disaster to them. See, e.g., Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co. Inc., 409
So.2d 1047 (Fla.1982); DeLapp v. Xtraman Inc., 417 N.W.2d 219, 221 (Iowa 1987);
Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 570 (Md.1991); Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp.,
438 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn.1989). These courts have concluded that the imposition of
strict liability on successor corporations is inconsistent with the principle of
products liability law that imposees responsibility on the party who created the
risk and was in a position to prevent its occurrence. See also Johnston v. Amsted
Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141 (Colo.Ct.App.1992); Downtowner v. Acrometal Prods.,
Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118 (N.D.1984); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820, 827
(Wis.1985).
Corporate successor liability has been the subject of considerable law review
commentary. See, e.g., Phillips, Product Continuity and Successor Corporation
Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 906 (1983) (the article contains an exhaustive
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listing of law review literature; author supports the "product line" exception);
Green, Successor Liability: The Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect Product
Liability Claimants, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 17 (1986) (criticizing the rationale
offered by courts and commentators in support of the liability based on "product
line" or "continuity of business enterprise" and suggesting a statutory solution
to the problem by requiring dissolving corporations to provide products liability
plaintiffs with adequate protection); Note, A Policy Analysis of a Successor
Corporation's Liability for Its Predecessor's Defective Products When the
Successor Has Acquired the Predecessor's Assets for Cash, 71 Marq. L. Rev. 815
(1982) (author criticizes the rationale offered to support expansive rules
imposing liability on successor corporations and suggests expansion of independent
duty to warn and fraudulent transfer category when the successor had actual or
constructive knowledge of product defects); Rogala, Nontraditional Successor
Product Liability: Should Society Be Forced to Pay the Cost?, 68 U. Det. L. J. 37
(1990) (economic analysis supports the retention of the four basic exceptions and
the rejection of "product line" and "continuity of enterprise" theories); Comment,
Successor Liability: The Debate Over the Continuity of Enterprise Exception in
Ohio Is Really No Debate at All, 21 Ohio N.L. Rev. 297 (author criticizes both
"product line" and "continuity of enterprise" exceptions and predicts that Ohio
will follow four traditional exceptions). Much of the law review commentary
supports liberalizing the rules imposing liability on corporate successors. The
articles acknowledge, however, the overwhelming judicial rejection of the
liberalizing rules. It is interesting that, after an early spurt of cases in the
late 1970s and early 1980s arguing for more expansive liability, courts have
refused to impose liability unless the plaintiff is able to come within the four
traditional exceptions. See Green, Successors and CERCLA: The Imperfect Analogy to
Products Liability and an Alternative Proposal, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 897, 909-10
(1993); Henderson and Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An
Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 479, 492 and n.64 (1990) .
Several courts and commentators have recognized that the problems set forth in
this Comment can best be addressed by legislation. For an insightful analysis and
recommendation, see Green, Successor Liability: The Superiority of Statutory
Reform to Protect Product Liability Claimants, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 17 (1986)
(criticizing the rationale offered by courts and commentators in support of
liability based on "product line" or "continuity of business enterprise" and
suggesting a statutory solution to the problem by requiring dissolving
corporations to provide products-liability plaintiffs with adequate protection).
Courts have repeatedly espoused the same view. See, e.g., Fish v. Amsted Indus.,
Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820, 829 (Wis.1985):
We conclude that the legislature is in a better position to make broad
public policy decisions in actions based on products liability law.
[Citation omitted]. The questions concerning the effect on the manufacturing
business, the potential size and economic strength of successor
corporations, the availability of commercial insurance and the cost of such
insurance are all questions that ... the legislature is in a better position
to ascertain.
A similar sentiment was expressed in Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437,
441 (7th Cir.1977):
In recent years, for a variety of reasons, many have thought it necessary
to turn to the courts in search of solutions to social problems. Courts are
2 006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

REST 3d TORTS-PL § 12

Page 10

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 12 (1998)
ill-equipped, however, to balance equities among future plaintiffs and
defendants.... [S]uch broad public policy issues are best handled by
legislatures with their comprehensive machinery for public input and debate.
See also Myers v. Putzmeister, Inc., 596 N.E.2d 754 (111.App.1992); Welco Indus,
v. Applied Co., 617 N.E.2d 1129 (Ohio 1993); Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press
Corp., 433 N.E.2d 1104 (111.App.Ct.1982); Holifield v. Setco Indus., Inc., 168
N.W.2d 177 (Wis.1969), overruled on other grounds, Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc.,
335 N.W.2d 578 (Wis.1983).
One possible statutory approach might be to require that whenever a product
manufacturer transfers a business or a product line as a going concern, some form
of bond or other security must be posted by the predecessor manufacturer in an
amount not to exceed the net value of the predecessor at time of transfer. The
value of the bond or other security would be available to future tort plaintiffs
to satisfy claims for harm caused by previously distributed defective products.
The posting of such a security would, under terms of the statute, protect the
successor from future liability for previously distributed products in excess of
the value of the security. Presumably, obligations on the bond would be limited in
time. Future plaintiffs injured by products previously distributed by the
predecessor would be no worse off financially than if the transfer of assets had
not occurred. The limit based on the value of the predecessor at the time of
transfer, with an appropriate time limit, would render more calculable the amount
of the security required, in contrast to the difficulty of calculating future
liabilities without such limits under the more expansive successor liability rules
applied in a minority of jurisdictions. The value of the predecessor's product
line as a going concern, whenever that value exceeds the cost of the security
against future liability, would be preserved without allowing the transfer of
assets to prejudice tort plaintiffs' chances of recovery.

Comment c. Nonliability

in the absence

of special

circumstances.

The following

jurisdictions have limited the liability of successor corporations to the four
exceptions set forth in § 12 and would reject both the "continuity of enterprise"
approach (Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich.1976)) and the
"product line" exception (Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal.1977)). See, e.g.,
Arkansas (Swayze v. A.O. Smith Corp., 694 F.Supp. 619, 623 (E.D.Ark.1988); Reed v.
Armstrong Cork Co., 577 F.Supp. 246, 247- 48 (E.D.Ark.1983)); Colorado (Florom v.
Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir.1989) (applying Colorado law); Johnston v.
Amsted Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141 (Colo.Ct.App.1992)); Florida (Bernard v. Kee
Mfg. Co., 409 So.2d 1047 (Fla.1982)); Georgia (Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 328
S.E.2d 726 (Ga.1985)); Illinois (Gonzalez v. Rock Wool Eng'g & Equip. Co., 453
N.E.2d 792 (111.App.Ct.1983); Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 395 N.E.2d 19
(111.App.Ct.1979)); Iowa (Pancratz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1996));
Kentucky (Conn v. Fales Div. of Mathewson Corp., 835 F.2d 145 (6th Cir.1987)
(applying Kentucky law)); Maryland (Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564
(Md.Ct.Spec.App.1991)); Massachusetts (Guzman v. MRM/Elgin, 567 N.E.2d 929
(Mass.1991)); Minnesota (Costello v. Unipress Corp., No. C6-95- 2341, 1996 WL
106215 (Minn.Ct.App., Mar. 12, 1996); Cooper v. Lakewood Engineering & Mfg. Co.,
45 F.3d 243 (8th Cir.1995) (applying Minnesota law)); Missouri (Bozell v. H & R
1871, Inc., 916 F.Supp. 951 (E.D.Mo.1996); Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers Southeast,
Inc., 849 F.2d 341, 343 (8th Cir.1988) (applying Missouri law)); Nebraska (Jones
v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481 (Neb.1982)); North Carolina (Budd
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Tire Corp. v. Pierce Tire Co., Inc., 370 S.E.2d 267 (N.C.Ct.App.1988); Comment,
Beyond Budd Tire: Examining Corporate Successor Liability in North Carolina, 30
Wake Forest L. Rev. 889 (Winter 1995)); North Dakota (Downtowner Inc. v. Acrometal
Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118 (N.D.1984)); Ohio (Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Co.,
617 N.E.2d 1129 (Ohio 1993)); Oklahoma (Goucher v. Parmac, Inc., 694 P.2d 953
(Okla.Ct.App.1984)); South Dakota (Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387
N.W.2d 515 (S.D.1986)); Texas (Griggs v. Capitol Mach. Works, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287
(Tex.Ct.App.1985); Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co., 709 S.W.2d 755 (Tex.Ct.App.1986));
Vermont (Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126 (Vt.1984)); Virginia (Harris
v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605 (Va.1992)); West Virginia (Jordan v. Ravenswood
Aluminum Corp., 455 S.E.2d 561 (W.Va.1995) (per curiam)); Wisconsin (Fish v.
Amsted Indus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820 (Wis.1985)); District of Columbia (LeSane v.
Hillenbrand Indus., 791 F.Supp. 871, 873-74 (D.D.C.1992) (applying District of
Columbia law)); Virgin Islands (Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75 (3d
Cir.1986, V. I.)). Only a few states appear to have adopted liability based on the
successor corporation's continuation of the predecessor's line of products:
California (Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal.1977)); New Jersey (Ramirez v.
Amsted Indus., 431 A.2d 811 (N.J.1981); (but see possible limit to "product line"
exception recognized in dicta in Leo v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 37 F.3d 96, 100-01
(3d Cir.1994) (applying New Jersey law) ("It seems apparent that, except perhaps
in design defect cases, a defect in a product when the manufacturer distributed
the product is likely to manifest itself and cause injury within a reasonable time
after the product is manufactured. Accordingly, as a practical matter, successor
liability under Ramirez is likely to be imposed in most cases, if at all, for a
limited period.")); New Mexico (Garcia v. Coe Manufacturing Co., 933 P.2d 243
(N.M.1997)); Pennsylvania (Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106
(Pa.Super.Ct.1981)); Bogart v. Phase II Pasta Machs., Inc., 817 F.Supp. 547
(E.D.Pa.1993)); Washington (Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash.1984); Fox
v. Sunmaster Prods., Inc., 821 P.2d 502 (Wash.Ct.App.1991) (the continued product
line must be the one that harms the plaintiff)). Although the product line
exception is still theoretically viable in Pennsylvania, if a plaintiff has a
possible remedy against the predecessor, a recent opinion held the exception could
not be invoked. LaFountain v. Webb Indus. Corp., 951 F.2d 544 (3d Cir.1991).
In an earlier draft of these Reporters' Notes, New Jersey was categorized as a
jurisdiction that employs a very liberal test for corporate successor liability, a
test premised on maximizing recovery rather than on evidence of express agreement
to be liable or substantial deprivation of remedies for plaintiffs against the
predecessor corporation. In support of this position Pacius v. Thermtroll Corp.,
611 A.2d 153 (N.J.Super.Ct.Law Div.1992), was cited. In that case, the court held
that any transfer of assets or use of the predecessor's goodwill entailed a de
facto merger that, in turn, triggered successor liability. Id. at 157. Elaborating
on the policy underlying this holding, the Pacius court quoted Rawlings v. DM
Oliver Inc., 159 Cal.Rptr. 119, 124 (1979) for the following proposition:
Fundamental fairness has been sought through a balancing of the rights of
the injured party against the rights of those engaged in business, including
the latter»s reasonable commercial expectations. Placing the economic burden
on those jbest able to pay for those costs, while permitting the transfer to
those most culpable is consistent with the equitable considerations inherent
in the resolution of the difficult problems which have been judicially
posed. The thrust from our high court as a matter of first priority has been
2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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to maximize

recovery

for

the

victim.

Id. at 157 (emphasis added).
Recently, however, New Jersey has reigned in the "deep pocket" approach set
forth above by the Pacius court. In Saez v. S & S Corrugated Paper Machinery Co.,
695 A.2d 740 (N.J.Super.App.Div.1997), the court expressed disagreement both with
the decision of the Pacius court and with this Restatement's earlier
characterization of New Jersey law. The court first noted that, in contrast to the
holding in Pacius,
in order for a successor corporation to be liable under New
Jersey law, the corporation must not only benefit from the predecessor's goodwill
but must also continue to manufacture the predecessor's product. Id at 16.
Moreover, the court stated that the question to answer in determining whether
successor liability has been triggered is "not whether there was 'any benefit that
the successor obtain[ed] from the acquisition of the assets of its predecessor' or
if the successor eliminated a competitor [since] [s]o broad a test would be no
test at all." Id.
Several other jurisdictions have imposed liability based on a continuation of
the predecessor's business even when there was no stock transfer or a common
identity of corporate directors. See, e.g., Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons, Co.,
369 So.2d 781, 785 (Ala.1979); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873
(Mich.1976); MacCleery v. T.S.S. Retail Corp., 882 F.Supp. 13 (D.N.H.1994).

Comment d. Agreement

for successor

to assume

liability.

1. For general authority that agreements to assume liability will be enforced
in favor of plaintiffs with products liability claims, see cases cited in the
Reporters' Note to Comment b2. General assumption of a predecessor's liability, even without specific
mention of products liability, will be interpreted to include liability for
products liability claims. See, e.g., Bouton v. Litton Indus., Inc., 423 F.2d 643
(3d Cir.1970) (applying New York law); Grugan v. BBC Brown Boveri, Inc., 729
F.Supp. 1080 (E.D.Pa.1990). If the contractual obligation as to the successor's
assumption of products liability is subject to conflicting interpretations, the
issue is for the trier of fact. See, e.g., Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857,
862-63 (9th Cir.1980) (applying California law); Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d
570, 574-76 (10th Cir.1989) (applying Colorado law); Davis v. Loopco Indus., Inc.,
609 N.E.2d 144 (Ohio 1993).
3. Contractual agreements by the successor to repair or service a product sold
by the predecessor do not amount to an agreement to assume products liability for
injuries caused by the predecessor's defective products. See, e.g., Schwartz v.
McGraw-Edison Co., 92 Cal.Rptr. 776 (Cal.Ct.App.1971) (disapproved on other
grounds in Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal.1977)); Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332
F.Supp. 526 (E.D.Pa.1971) (applying New York law). Whether agreements to service a
predecessor's products may create an independent duty to warn about defects is
discussed in connection with § 13.

Comment e. Fraudulent

transfer

in order

to avoid debts

or liabilities.

For the

reason set forth in the Comment, this exception has rarely been used to impose
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successor liability for products liability claims. However, in Schmoll v. AC & S,
Inc., 703 F.Supp. 868 (D.C.Or.1988), the court found that a complex corporate
restructuring was undertaken to avoid both pending and future liability to persons
who were certain to suffer asbestos-related illness and was thus the functional
equivalent of a fraudulent transfer. See also Morgan v. Cavalier Acquisition
Corp., 432 S.E.2d 915 (N.C.Ct.App.1993) (reversing summary judgment when
plaintiff's evidence raised a question of fact as to whether the defendant had
purchased assets from the predecessor corporation in order to avoid creditors'
claims); Budd Tire Corp. v. Pierce Tire Co., 370 S.E.2d 267 (N.C.Ct.App.1988);
Mullen v. Alarmguard of Delmarva, Inc., No. CIV. A. 90C-11-40-1-CV, 1993 WL 258696
(Del.Super.Ct., Jun.16, 1993).
A much closer question is whether a successor corporation's actual or
constructive knowledge that the predecessor's products are defective and likely to
cause injury in the future is sufficient to render the transaction sufficiently
tainted so as to come within the umbrella of this exception. There is little
authority on the issue. In Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 569 n. 2 (Md.1991)
, the court noted that either knowledge of pending claims or knowledge of product
defects might be sufficient to expose a successor liability since either would put
in question the bona fides of the transaction.
Comment f. Consolidation
or merger.
For a discussion of what constitutes a "de
facto merger," see Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, § 7124.20; American Law of
Products Liability § 7:10; Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability § 7.04[5];
Comment, Successor Liability: The Debate Over the Continuity of Enterprise
Exception in Ohio Is Really No Debate at All, 21 Ohio N.L. Rev. 297, 313
nn.136-137 (1994) (describing de facto merger and "mere continuation" doctrines).
When the successor purchases the assets of the predecessor for cash, a de facto
merger will not be found to have occurred. See, e.g., Travis v. Harris Corp., 565
F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir.1977) (applying Indiana law); Jordan v. Hawker Dayton
Corp., 62 F.3d 29 (1st Cir.1995) (applying Maine law); Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp.,
438 N.W.2d 96 (Minn.1989); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515,
518 (S.D.1986); Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439-40 (7th Cir.1977)
(applying Wisconsin law). Only courts applying the "continuity of enterprise"
exception will impose liability when the successor corporation purchased the
assets of the predecessor for cash and there is evidence of continuity of the
original business. See Reporters' Note to Comment c.
Comment g. Continuation
of the predecessor.
For a discussion of the "mere
continuation" exception, see Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations § 7124.10; American
Law of Products Liability § 7:14; Frumer and Friedman § 7.04 [4] . Also see Winch
v. Yates Am. Mach. Co., Inc., 613 N.Y.S.2d 980 (N.Y.App.Div.1994); Swayze v. A.O.
Smith Corp., 694 F.Supp. 619 (E.D.Ark.1988); Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570,
578 n. 3 (10th Cir.1989) (applying Colorado law); Johnston v. Amsted Indus., Inc.,
830 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Colo.Ct.App.1992); Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 567
(Md.1991); Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620 (8th Cir.1981) (applying
Missouri law); Chemical Design, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc., 847 S.W.2d 488
(Mo.Ct.App.1993); U.S. v. Atlas Minerals & Chem., Inc., 824 F.Supp. 46
(E.D.Pa.1993); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515, 518
(S.D.1986).
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In analyzing continuation questions, some courts require purchase of stock or
other benchmarks in order to establish the requisite continuity. See, e.g.,
Gehin-Scott v. Newson, Inc., 848 F.Supp. 585 (E.D.Pa.1994); Pancratz v. Monsanto
Co., 547 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1996) ("[t]he exception has no application without
proof of continuity of management and ownership between the predecessor and
successor corporations"); Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 §.E.2d 605 (Va.1992) (also
requiring a common identity of officers, directors, and stockholders). Other
courts deny a merger if no transfer of assets has taken place, as in Carreiro v.
Rhodes Gill & Co., 68 F.3d 1443 (1st Cir.1995). Contra, Jordan v. Hawker Dayton
Corp., 62 F.3d 29 (1st Cir.1995) (applying Maine law) (holding that purchase of
assets is not sufficient to warrant a finding of a de facto merger); Lemelle v.
Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268 (5th Cir.1994) (applying Louisiana law). But
several other states have imposed liability based on a continuation of the
predecessor's business even when there was no stock transfer or common identity of
corporate directors. See, e.g., Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons, Co., 369 So.2d
781, 785 (Ala.1979); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich.1976);
MacCleery v. T.S.S. Retail Corp., Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 1(1409 (D. N.H. 1994). See
generally Sweatland v. Park Corp., 587 N.Y.S.2d 54 (N.Y.App.Div.1992).
Research References
1. Digest System Key Numbers
Products Liability €=> 23.1, 25.
2. A.L.R. Annotations
Liability of successor corporation for punitive damages for injury caused by
predecessor's product. 55 ALR4th 166.
Successor products liability: form of business organization of successor or
predecessor as affecting successor liability. 32 ALR4th 196.
Products liability: liability of successor corporation for injury or damage caused
by product issued by predecessor. 66 ALR3d 824.
Comment Note.--Validity and construction of state statute making successor
corporation liable for taxes of predecessor. 65 ALR3d 1181.
Similarity of ownership or control as basis for charging corporation acquiring
assets of another with liability for former owner's debts. 49 ALR3d 881.
Case Citations
Case Citations July 1984 through June 2003
Case Citations July 2004 through June 2005
Case Citations July 1984 through June 2003:
Note:

On p. 219 of the Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liability, Reporters'
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Note to § 12, comment d, should read as follows:
For general authority
that
agreements to assume liability
will be enforced in favor of plaintiffs
with
products liability
claims, see cases cited in the Reporters'
Note to comment b.
M.D.Ga.1999. Com. (b) cit. in disc. A corporation that purchased assets of a
limited partnership brought a CERCLA action against the limited partnership for
contribution of funds for cleanup costs. This court denied defendant's motion for
summary judgment, holding, inter alia, that the bill of sale failed to transfer
environmental liability from the seller to the buyer. The court rejected
defendant's assertion that the court should infer an agreement by plaintiff to
assume the liabilities of the seller by virtue of plaintiff's status as a
successor corporation. Even if plaintiff was a mere continuation of seller, that
only meant that plaintiff assumed the partnership's environmental liabilities with
respect to third parties. There was no case-law precedent that a successor
corporation was liable to its predecessor based solely on the relationship between
the two parties. Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. Cleveland, 72 F.Supp.2d 1373, 1381.
S.D.Ga.2003. Com. (h) quot. but dist. After worker was killed in explosion of
pressure vessel, representatives of his estate brought state-court action against
corporate successors to manufacturer of pressure vessel; defendants removed action
to federal court. Granting plaintiffs' motion to remand, district court held that
removal was barred by unanimity rule. The court commented that successor liability
might have no application where, following corporate reorganization, there was no
devolution of assets and liabilities to successor corporations, and predecessor
corporation continued to exist. Bussey v. Modern Welding Co., 245 F.Supp.2d 1269,
1275-1276.
D.Mass. 1997. Quot. in d i s c , com. (b) cit. in disc. (Proposed Final Draft,
1997). Potentially responsible parties (PRPs) who entered a consent decree with
the EPA regarding the cleanup of a dump site brought a contribution action under
CERCLA against nonsettling PRPs. This court, among other dispositions, determined
that to the extent that CERCLA provided that a successor corporation who owns a
facility where hazardous waste was deposited will be liable even though the
successor did not actually dispose of the waste, the statute expressed a choice
for somewhat greater successor liability than was either the choice manifested in
precedents or the choice supported by the Restatement. The court noted that the
need for substantive law rules to protect against transactions and events that had
"judgment-proofing consequences" in waste-disposal cases had been recognized in
the area of products liability. Acushnet Co. v. Coaters, Inc., 972 F.Supp. 41, 66,
affirmed 191 F.3d 69 (1st Cir.1999).
S.D.N.Y.2002. Com. (b) cit. in disc, and cit. in ftn., Rptr's Notes to corns,
(b) and (c) cit. in ftn. Creditor sought to recover debt from corporation that
purchased assets of debtor-corporation. Adopting magistrate's report and
recommendation, this court granted purchaser's motions for summary judgment and
dismissal, holding, inter alia, that creditor's complaint failed to establish
successor liability under theory of "de facto merger," since creditor failed to
plead continuity of ownership. Cargo Partner AG v. Albatrans, Inc., 207 F.Supp.2d
86, 106, 112, affirmed 352 F.3d 41 (2d Cir.2003).
Alaska, 2000. Cit. generally in d i s c , com. (b) and Rptr's Note cit. in ftn.
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After a child was injured when a defective rifle discharged during target
shooting, child's father sued the rifle manufacturer and its distributor.
Distributor filed a third-party action for indemnification from manufacturer's
successor. The trial court held that successor corporation could be held liable.
This court reversed and remanded, holding, inter alia, that the court would adopt
the "continuity of enterprise" exception to the general rule of nonliability for
corporate successors. To permit successor to avoid liability would give it an
unwarranted windfall; the court's new rule would give manufacturing corporations
additional incentives to market nondefective products, in order to maximize the
corporations' market value in event of sale. Savage Arms, Inc. v. Western Auto
Supply, 18 P.3d 49, 56-58.
Ariz.App.2003. Cit. and quot. in sup.; cit. in ftn.; subsecs. (b) and (d) quot.
in sup.; Rptr's Note, com. (b) , quot. in d i s c ; Rptr's Note, com. (c) , cit. in
disc. Worker who was injured when a pane of glass he was installing shattered
brought a products-liability action against successor of glass-pane manufacturer.
Affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendant, this court
held that Arizona products-liability law did not apply to successor corporations
not involved in placing the product into the stream of commerce. The court
deferred to the legislature the question whether successor corporations should
take on the risk-spreading role of the original manufacturer. Winsor v. Glasswerks
PHX, L.L.C., 204 Ariz. 303, 63 P.3d 1040, 1045, 1048, 1050.
Ga.App.1997. Cit. in disc. (Proposed Final Draft, 1997). A motorist who was
injured in a collision with a rig consisting of a tractor and two trailers, one of
which had come unhitched, sued the driver of the rig and the driver's employer.
Defendants then filed a third-party complaint against the corporation that had
purchased the assets of the manufacturer of the rig's hitch pin that allegedly
failed. Reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the corporation,
this court held, inter alia, that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether the corporation had assumed the liabilities of the manufacturer so as to
render the corporation strictly liable in tort to the motorist for a defect in the
hitch pin. Corbin v. Farmex, Inc., 227 Ga.App. 620, 490 S.E.2d 395, 397, reversed
269 Ga. 548, 501 S.E.2d 802 (1998), opinion vacated 506 S.E.2d 406 (Ga.App.1998) .
Ky.2002. Cit. in disc. Mother whose son lost part of his leg while trying to
unclog a silo unloader brought a products-liability action against manufacturer of
silo unloaders under a theory of successor-in-interest liability. The trial court
entered summary judgment for defendant, and the court of appeals affirmed.
Affirming, this court held, inter alia, that defendant was not liable on a
successor-liability theory because defendant did not expressly or impliedly agree
to assume the liabilities of the selling corporation whose assets it purchased,
the transaction was not a consolidation or merger, defendant was not a
continuation of the selling corporation, and the transaction was not entered into
fraudulently. Pearson ex rel. Trent v. National Feeding Systems, Inc., 90 S.W.3d
46, 51.
N.J.1998. Com. (b) cit. in disc, and quot. in diss, op., Rptr's Note quot. in
diss. op. After a convenience-store worker who cut his hand on the unguarded blade
of a meat-slicing machine brought a products-liability action against the
machine's manufacturer, which did not answer, and a distributor, the distributor
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filed a third-party complaint for indemnification against the alleged
successor-in-interest of the manufacturer. The trial court granted successor's
motion for summary judgment dismissing distributor's third-party claim, and the
appellate division reversed. Affirming as modified, this court held, inter alia,
that distributors and retailers could seek indemnification, pursuant to the
"product-line exception," from corporations that purchased all or substantially
all of the original manufacturer's assets and undertook essentially the same
manufacturing operation. The dissent argued that the product-line exception was
intended to provide an otherwise remediless injured plaintiff with a source of
compensation and should not be extended to benefit corporate defendants. Mettinger
v. Globe Slicing Mach., 153 N.J. 371, 381, 394, 709 A.2d 779, 783, 790.
N.J. 1999. Cit. in d i s c , cit. in diss, op., corns, (a) and (b) cit. in disc.
Injured forklift operator brought products-liability action against manufacturer
of forklift and manufacturer's successor-in-interest. The trial court dismissed
successor on the ground that it had acquired manufacturer's assets in a bankruptcy
sale that was free and clear of any interests in the purchased property. The
intermediate appellate court reversed. Affirming, this court held, in part, that
the "product-line" exception to the general rule of successor nonliability applied
here, where successor continued to manufacture the line of products it acquired
from its predecessor. Dissent believed that plaintiff could and should have filed
a claim against the intermediate purchaser in that entity's bankruptcy proceeding;
therefore, successor liability was not justified. Lefever v. K.P. Hovnanian
Enterprises, Inc., 160 N.J. 307, 734 A.2d 290, 294, 295, 300, 301.
N. J.Super .1997. Com. (a) and Rptr's Notes cit. and quot. in d i s c , com. (c)
quot. in disc (Proposed Final Draft, 1997). A worker who was injured while
operating an allegedly defective flexofolder gluer machine manufactured by a
now-bankrupt company brought suit against, among others, the licensee of the right
to manufacture and market the machine. The trial court denied defendant's motion
for summary judgment. Remanding for further proceedings on the issue of
defendant's successor liability, this court held, inter alia, that genuine issues
of material fact, precluding summary judgment, existed as to whether defendant in
fact continued the manufacturer's product line and whether it in fact held itself
out to the industry as doing so. The court noted that, for successor liability
under New Jersey law, there must be a continued manufacture of the product line
wherein the purchaser utilized the predecessor's name and good will. Saez v. S & S
Corrugated Paper, 302 N.J.Super. 545, 555-557, 695 A.2d 740, 746.
N.Y.Sup.Ct.App.Div.1999. Com. (b) and Rptr's Note cit. in disc. City sued
successors of a manufacturer of asbestos-containing plaster, seeking to recover
the costs of abating the asbestos-containing materials from their buildings. Trial
court granted defendants summary judgment. This court affirmed, holding that the
successors did not succeed to the manufacturer's liabilities. The court declined
to adopt the "product line" theory of successor's liability, noting that that
approach implicated complex economic considerations better left to be addressed by
the legislature. City of New York v. Charles Pfizer & Company, Inc., 260 A.D.2d
174, 688 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25.
N.Y.Sup.Ct.App.Div.1999. Cit. in disc After a 50-year-old man died while
undergoing exploratory surgery as a result of internal bleeding due to an
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angiosarcoma mass on his liver, his widow sued corporate defendants for products
liability, seeking to hold defendants liable as successors in interest to the
manufacturer of a radioactive contrast dye administered to the decedent as a
10-year-old child. Trial court granted summary judgment to all but one of the
corporate defendants. This court reversed in part, holding, inter alia, that the
trial court erred in applying the product-line exception to hold the one defendant
liable, because this defendant only owned the dye-related assets for six months
and thus did not have the opportunity or ability to estimate the risk of claims
and to pass the cost of meeting those risks along to the public. In addition, this
successor defendant did not reap the benefits of the predecessor's good will by
continuing to sell the dye. Rothstein v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 259 A.D.2d
54, 696 N.Y.S.2d 528, 531.
Pa.Super.2000. Cit. and quot. in ftn. Employee who was injured when she was
thrown from her employer's modified van brought, in part, a
strict-products-liability claim against former corporate owners of the van, which
had been transferred, along with other corporate assets, to plaintiff's employer
as the result of a stock sale. Affirming the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for defendants, this court held, inter alia, that defendants, who were
not in the business of selling vans, were not "sellers" within the meaning of
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, and thus were not strictly liable for the
alleged defects in the van. Gavula v. ARA Services, Inc., 756 A.2d 17, 21.
Tex.2000. Cit. in disc. After two Marines were killed in a Navy helicopter
crash due to the failure of a bearing, victims' survivors brought a wrongful-death
suit against several corporations, including bearing manufacturer's successor,
alleging products liability and negligence. Trial court entered judgment on jury
verdict for plaintiffs. Appellate court affirmed in part. This court reversed in
part and remanded, holding, inter alia, that trial court erroneously instructed
jury on successor manufacturer's liability, because jury charge omitted elements
necessary to impose liability under plaintiffs' negligent-undertaking claim.
Although plaintiffs cited Restatement Third of Torts: Products Liability §§ 10-13,
the court did not decide whether those sections were consistent with Texas law.
Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 836.
Tex. App. 2000. Quot. in d i s c , com. (a) quot. in part in ftn., subsecs. (3) and
(4) cit. generally in ftn. Class of foundry workers sued manufacturers and
suppliers of silica products and safety equipment to recover damages for personal
injuries allegedly resulting from their exposure to silica compounds. One
defendant, as successor-in-interest to corporation that bought one supplier's
assets, answered with a verified denial that challenged its capacity to be sued.
Reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiffs and
remanding, this court held, inter alia, that under Delaware law, the corporation
that bought the assets did not expressly or impliedly assume liability for the
seller's contingent torts, and thus defendant had no successor liability. Lockheed
Martin Corp. v. Gordon, 16 S.W.3d 127, 134, 135.
Tex.App.2001. Quot. generally in ftn., cit. generally in cases cit. in disc.
Author sued publisher, its owner, and her son for breach of contract, fraud, and
violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The trial
court sustained jurisdiction over defendants, denying their special appearances.
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Reversing in part and remanding, this court held that publisher was not subject to
personal jurisdiction as successor-in-interest to debtor company that had
misrepresented to plaintiff its ability to publish his book, where publisher had
purchased only assets of debtor in debtor's bankruptcy proceeding. The court said
that publisher had not expressly assumed seller's liabilities, and no other
statute applied to provide an exception to the rule of successor nonliability for
purchasers of assets. Shapolsky v. Brewton, 56 S.W.3d 120, 139.
Case Citations July 2004 through June 2005:
D.Ariz.2003. Cit. in case cit. in ftn. After dogs became ill when they ate pet
food, pet-food manufacturer sued company that sold it vomitoxin-infected wheat,
alleging strict products liability. This court granted defendant summary judgment,
holding that wheat containing vomitoxin was not unreasonably dangerous under the
consumer-expectation test, since a reasonable jury could not objectively find that
wheat containing vomitoxin in excess of 5 ppm or in excess of maximum level that
FDA said was safe for certain animals (10 ppm) was dangerous to extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by ordinary pet-food manufacturer contracting for feed
wheat in 1995. The court did not determine whether the wheat containing vomitoxin
that defendant provided to plaintiff was defective as a matter of law. Southwest
Pet Products, Inc. v. Koch Industries, 273 F.Supp.2d 1041, 1052.
N.H.2003. Rptr's Note cit. in case cit. in disc. Holders of a promissory note
sued corporate maker's successor to recover the balance due. Affirming the trial
court's entry of judgment for defendant, this court rejected the more expansive
"substantial continuity" version of the "mere continuation" exception to the
prohibition against successor liability, and held, inter alia, that the fact that
three separate entities, i.e., selling corporation, new corporation that continued
selling corporation's commercial real estate operations, and defendant, existed
after defendant's purchase of original maker's residential real estate assets
precluded successor liability from being imposed on defendant under the
mere-continuation exception. Bielagus v. EMRE of New Hampshire Corp., 149 N.H.
635, 826 A.2d 559, 569.

Tex.App.2004. Cit. in ftn. Commissioned-sales agent for magnetometers
manufacturer sought to recover commissions under sales agreements, after assets of
manufacturer were purchased by successor entity, by claiming, among other things,
that successor entity tortiously interfered with the agreements. Trial court,
inter alia, directed verdict for successor entity on this claim. Affirming in
part, this court held, inter alia, that by enacting article 5.10(B)(2) of the
Business Corporation Act, the legislature rejected three exceptions to the
majority rule of successor nonliability, including the "mere continuation" theory
claimed here; therefore, as matter of law, successor entity showed that its
acquisition of manufacturer's assets was justified, and that it was not liable for
payment on the agreements. C M . Asfahl Agency v. Tensor, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 768, 792.
(1998)
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Chapter 3. Liability Of Successors And Apparent Manufacturers
§ 13. Liability Of Successor For Harm Caused By Successor's Own Post-Sale Failure
To Warn
Link to Case Citations
(a) A successor corporation or other business entity that acquires assets of a
predecessor corporation or other business entity, whether or not liable under the
rule stated in § 12, is subject to liability for harm to persons or property
caused by the successor's failure to warn of a risk created by a product sold or
distributed by the predecessor if:
(1) the successor undertakes or agrees to provide services for maintenance
or repair of the product or enters into a similar relationship with purchasers
of the predecessor's products giving rise to actual or potential economic
advantage to the successor, and
(2) a reasonable person in the position of the successor would provide a
warning.
(b) A reasonable person in the position of the successor would provide a
warning if:
(1) the successor knows or reasonably should know that the product poses a
substantial risk of harm to persons or property; and
(2) those to whom a warning might be provided can be identified and can
reasonably be assumed to be unaware of the risk of harm; and
(3) a warning can be effectively communicated to and acted on by those to
whom a warning might be provided; and
(4) the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify the burden of
providing a warning.
Comment:
a. Rationale.
Corporations that acquire assets from other corporations are
liable for harm caused by defective products sold by predecessors only in limited
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circumstances. See § 12. This Section subjects a successor to liability for its
own failure to warn after acquiring the predecessor's assets when certain
conditions are satisfied and when a reasonable person in the successor's position
would provide a warning. Liability under this Section is similar to liability
under § 10, in which a seller is liable for harm caused by breach of a post-sale
duty to warn even if the product was not defective at the time of original sale.
Unlike product sellers in § 10, the successor governed by this Section did not
manufacture or sell the defective product. However, by virtue of succeeding to the
predecessor's interests, the successor is often in a good position to learn of
problems arising from use of the predecessor's product and to prevent harm to
persons or property. When the relationship between the successor and pre-transfer
purchasers of the predecessor's products gives rise to actual or potential
economic benefit to the successor, it is both fair and efficient to require the
successor to act reasonably to prevent such harm.

jb. Relationship

between

the successor

and the predecessor's

customers.

Absent

some additional circumstance besides having become a successor, the successor
remains a pure volunteer upon whom the law usually imposes no duty to act or to
warn. Many courts have recognized four elements as being significant in
determining the existence of a duty to warn: (1) succession to a predecessor's
service contracts; (2) coverage of the defective product under a service contract
made directly with the successor; (3) actual service of the defective product by
the successor; and (4) the successor's knowledge of the existence of defects and
the identities of the predecessor's customers who own the defective product.
However, these factors are not exhaustive and the inquiry should be whether the
successor's relationships with the predecessor's customers give rise to actual or
potential economic advantage.
In most instances, in the absence of service contracts governing the
predecessor's products or actual service of the defective product by the
successor, it will be difficult to establish that the successor's relationships
with the predecessor's customers give rise to actual or potential economic benefit
to the successor. Furthermore, in the absence of service contracts, it may be
difficult to establish under Subsection (b)(1) through (4) that a reasonable
person in the position of the successor would provide a warning. Thus, when the
successor has established no systematic relationships with the predecessor's
customers through service contracts, usually the successor has no practical method
of identifying those customers and communicating effectively with them. The
successor who has no continuing contacts with a predecessor's customers may also
be unable to discover risks that should be addressed through warnings. Similarly,
when a successor has discontinued both the sale of a predecessor's product line
and the provision of services to the predecessor's customers, it may not be in a
position reasonably to discover risks about the discontinued line or to determine
the persons to whom a warning should be addressed.
Notwithstanding the importance of service contracts in the application of this
Section, a contract is not the only method of establishing a relationship with a
predecessor's customers. For example, a successor may sell or offer to sell spare
parts to the predecessor's customers for machinery sold by the predecessor when
the successor knows or should know the machinery is defective. Such conduct should
be considered by courts in deciding whether sufficient actual or potential
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economic advantage has accrued to the successor to warrant the imposition of a
duty to warn the predecessor's customers.

c. Factors

in determining

whether

a reasonable

successor

would provide

a

warning.
Whether a reasonable person in the successor's position would provide a
warning is governed by the same requirements that determine whether a reasonable
seller should provide a post-sale warning under § 10. Subsection (b)(1) through
(4) are identical to the requirements set forth in Subsection (b)(1) through (4)
of § 10 and are explained in the Comments to § 10.
Illustrations:
1. ABC Corp., which manufactures and sells plastic molding machines,
transfers all its assets to XYZ Corp. for cash and then dissolves. There is no
continuity of shareholders, officers, or directors from ABC to XYZ. Thus, XYZ
is not liable as a successor corporation for defective products previously sold
by ABC under the rule stated in § 12. Marks Plastics Co. purchased five Model
1010 molding machines from ABC one year before ABC's transfer of assets to XYZ.
At that time Marks entered into a three-year service contract with ABC. After
acquiring ABC's assets, XYZ continues to service ABC's customers and
periodically sends its service people to the Marks plant. The ongoing service
contracts between XYZ and Marks constitute relationships that give rise to
actual economic advantage to XYZ. Two years after acquiring ABC's assets, XYZ
begins to receive reports from the field that, after completing one cycle, the
Model 1010 machine sometimes recycles unexpectedly. XYZ does not inform Marks
about the problem. Subsequently, Marks's employee, E, is injured when the Model
1010 recycles unexpectedly. XYZ owes a duty to E to act as a reasonable person
in warning Marks about the dangers attendant to the use of Model 1010. Whether
XYZ breached its duty is to be determined based on the factors set forth in
Subsection (b)(1) through (4).
2. Same facts as Illustration 1, except that XYZ does not succeed to any
service contracts from ABC nor does it enter into any service contracts of its
own with Marks Plastic Co. However, after XYZ becomes aware of the recycling
problem with the Model 1010 machine it enters into negotiations with Marks to
sell replacement parts for the Model 1010. Before the sale is completed, Mark's
employee, E, is injured when the Model 1010 unexpectedly recycles. The offer to
sell replacement parts for Model 1010 constitutes a relationship that gives
rise to potential economic advantages to XYZ. XYZ owes a duty to act as a
reasonable person in providing a warning. Whether XYZ breached its duty to E to
warn Marks about the dangers attendant to the use of the Model 1010 is to be
determined upon the basis of the factors set forth in Subsection (b)(1) through
(4) .
3. Same facts as Illustration 1, except that, upon purchasing the assets of
ABC, XYZ discontinues the manufacture and sale of molding machines and
thereafter manufactures only drill presses. XYZ also discontinues all service
contracts with ABC's customers, including Marks, and is not otherwise in
contact with them. XYZ is not subject to liability for failure to warn. There
is no relationship between XYZ and Marks that would give rise to actual or
potential benefit to XYZ. XYZ has no duty to warn Marks about the dangers
attendant to the use of the Model 1010.
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REPORTERS1 NOTE
Comment a. Rationale.
A significant body of case law supports the proposition
that a successor corporation has an independent duty to warn when it has a
substantial continuing relationship with the customer of the predecessor
corporation. See, e.g., Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 866 (9th Cir.1980)
(applying California law); Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570, 577 (10th
Cir.1989) (applying Colorado law); Gonzalez v. Rock Wool Eng'g & Equip., 453
N.E.2d 792 (111.App.Ct.1983); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 449 (7th
Cir.1977) (applying Indiana law); Stratton v. Garvey Int'l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290
(Kan.Ct.App.1984); Patton v. TIC United Corp., 77 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir.1996)
(applying Kansas law); Pelc v. Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., 314 N.W.2d 614, 621
(Mich.Ct.App.1981); Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 177 (5th Cir.1985)
(applying Mississippi law); Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620 (8th
Cir.1981) (applying Missouri law); Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 356 A.2d 458
(N.J.Super.Ct.Law Div.1976); Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 451 N.E.2d 195
(N.Y.1983); Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods. Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 125
(N.D.1984); Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331, 337-38 (Ohio
1987); Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F.Supp. 526 (E.D.Pa.1971); Tracey by Tracey v.
Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 745 F.Supp. 1099 (E.D.Pa.1990) (applying New York
law); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126, 127-28 (Vt.1984); Polius v.
Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 84 (3d Cir.1986) (applying Virgin Islands law);
Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 441-42 (7th Cir.1977) (applying
Wisconsin law).
In a recent case, Sherlock v. Quality Control Equipment Co., 79 F.3d 731 (8th
Cir.1996) (applying Missouri law), the court affirmed a jury verdict for the
plaintiff against a successor corporation that sold replacement parts for a
machine sold to the predecessor's customer and rejected the defendant's argument
that it had no post-sale duty to warn the predecessor's customers of dangers it
had learned about concerning the machinery after succeeding to the interests of
the predecessor. The court said:
In determining the existence of a relationship sufficient to justify
foisting a duty to warn of known dangers on the successor corporation, the
courts have often cited four factors as being significant. See, e.g.,
Tucker,
645 F.2d at 626. These elements include: "(1) succession to a predecessor's
service contracts; (2) coverage of the particular machine under the contract;
(3) service of that machine by the purchaser-corporation; and (4) the
purchaser-corporation's knowledge of defects and of the location or owner of

that machine." Id. While these factors
are indisputably
important,
and in manycases dispositive,
we remain mindful that they are merely useful tools which
provide evidence in resolving
the ultimate
inquiry:
whether there is an
adequate nexus between the successor and the predecessor's
customers.
See
Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 125 (N.D.1984) (
"This listing [of factors] cannot be said to be exhaustive."). As explained in
one of the foremost authorities on corporate law:
The critical element required for the imposition of the duty is a continuing
relationship between the successor and the predecessor's customers for the
benefit of the successor. Hence, rather than relying only on the four specific
factors above, which are not exhaustive in establishing a nexus between the
successor and its predecessor's customers sufficient to justly impose an
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independent duty to warn upon notice of dangers or potential dangers, the
courts also employ a risk/benefit analysis. Thus, the focus in deciding whether
the relationship between the successor corporation and the preexisting customer
is sufficient to create a duty to warn has been upon the actual or potential
economic advantage to the successor corporation.
15 William M. Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
Corporations § 7123.08 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990).
Id. at 734 (emphasis added).

The court reviewed the evidence and found that a sufficient nexus was made out
to support an independent post-sale duty to warn:
Relying on testimony from Quality's own officers and employees, the jury
could reasonably have inferred that in 1983 Quality was probably the sole
remaining manufacturer in the world of chitterling cleaning machines.
Further, it appeared that Quality was by far the most easily accessible, if
not the only, supplier of replacement parts for the Strickler chitterling
cleaning machine. Indeed, this state of affairs contributed to Quality's
decision to purchase the rights to assemble the machine, as Quality's
president testified that an "attractive" feature of the transaction was the
fact that Strickler was going out of business and Quality would thus be able
to "step into [Strickler's] shoes" vis a vis the predecessor corporation's
customers. Consequently, one could justifiably conclude that Quality
perceived it to be economically advantageous to foster relationships with
Strickler's customers; for, through these associations, Quality would have
the opportunity not only to peddle replacement parts, but to one day
possibly benefit from the sale of new machines to a clientele with
apparently no other viable source for a needed product. To be sure, Quality
did benefit in the instant case, having sold replacement parts to Monfort on
twenty-four separate occasions.
79 F.3d at 735.

For a comprehensive and thoughtful analysis of this subject, see Victoria A.
Kommer, The Successor Corporation's Continuing Duty to Warn, 23 Prod. Safety &
Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, p. 990 et seq. (1995). The author notes that the cases
speak of a "special relationship" necessary to trigger a duty to warn but fail to
give content to that term.
As the Comment indicates, many courts place heavy emphasis on whether the
successor had ongoing service contracts with the customer of the predecessor
corporation. See, e.g., Florom v. Elliott Mfg. Co., 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir.1989)
(applying Colorado law); Stratton v. Garvey Int'l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290
(Kan.App.1984); Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168 (5th Cir.1985)
(applying Mississippi law); Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620 (8th Cir.1981)
(applying Missouri law); Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1986)
(applying Virgin Islands law). But see Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 451
N.E.2d 195 (N.Y.1983). This Section does not make the existence of a service
contract a sine qua non for the imposition of a duty to warn on a successor
corporation. Other similar relationships with purchasers of the predecessor's
products giving rise to actual or potential economic advantage to the successor
2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

REST 3d TORTS-PL § 13

Page 6

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 13 (1998)
may suffice to create a duty to act reasonably and provide warnings.

Comment c. Factors

in determining

whether

a reasonable

successor

would

provide

a warningAlthough some courts list actual or constructive knowledge of defect as
a "factor" to be considered in determining whether a successor corporation owes a
duty to warn others require actual knowledge as a necessary condition for the
imposition of liability on the successor corporation. See, e.g., Gee v. Tenneco,
Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 865-66 (9th Cir.1980); Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co.,
507 N.E.2d 331, 337-38 (Ohio 1987); Downtowner v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347
N.W.2d 118, 125 (N.D.1984); Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 84 (3d
Cir.1986) (applying Virgin Islands law).
This Section does not require actual knowledge of the risk as a condition for
imposing liability. This is true both with regard to a seller's post-sale duty to
warn and to a successor's independent duty to warn. As a practical matter it may
be very difficult to establish that a seller or a successor could reasonably be
saddled with the duty to investigate product performance. But the law should not
establish an absolute barrier to recovery if constructive knowledge can be
established. Otherwise one would encourage sellers or successors to close their
eyes so that they not be tinged with "actual knowledge" that would impose duty
upon them. As noted, drug manufacturers quite routinely have a duty to keep up
with scientific research and to investigate when information of risk is brought to
their attention. Other products may involve very significant risk and may require
similar investigation. Thus, the duty to go out and "discover" risk may most often
impose too onerous a burden. However, when the facts justify investigation and it
can be practically accomplished, this Section sets up no artificial barrier
against recovery.
Research References
1. Digest System Key Numbers
Products Liability €=> 14, 23.1, 25.
2. A.L.R. Annotations
Products liability: liability of manufacturer or seller as affected by failure of
subsequent party in distribution chain to remedy or warn against defect of
which he knew. 45 ALR4th 777.
Strict products liability: liability for failure to warn as dependent on
defendant's knowledge of danger. 33 ALR4th 368.
Products liability: liability of successor corporation for injury or damage caused
by product issued by predecessor. 66 ALR3d 824.
Failure to warn as basis of liability under doctrine of strict liability in tort.
53 ALR3d 23 9.
Liability of corporation for torts of subsidiary. 7 ALR3d 1343.
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Manufacturer's or seller's duty to give warning regarding product as affecting his
liability for product-caused injury. 76 ALR2d 9.
Case Citations
Case Citations July 1984 through June 2003
Case Citations July 2004 through June 2005
Case Citations July 1984 through June 2003:
Cal.App.2000. Cit. in d i s c , subsec. (b) cit. and quot. in disc. After a plane
crash allegedly caused by a malfunction in the plane engine's carburetor, the
pilot and the passenger sued an aircraft-parts manufacturer that did not
manufacture or sell this particular model of carburetor but acquired the product
line from a predecessor that had acquired it from the original manufacturer. The
carburetor was manufactured and sold in 1968, over 25 years prior to the accident.
Trial court granted defendant summary judgment, holding that the General Aviation
Revitalization Act barred plaintiffs' claims against defendant in its capacity as
successor to the original manufacturer. This court affirmed, holding, inter alia,
that plaintiffs failed to establish a negligence cause of action based on a theory
of independent duty to warn. The court stated that imposing a separate and
independent duty based on general principles of tort law would not only be
superfluous in light of the federal statutory scheme regulating and overseeing the
duties of manufacturers in the general aviation industry, but would also directly
conflict with that statutory scheme. Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 78
Cal.App.4th 681, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 124, 134, 136.
Ga.App.1997. Cit. in disc. (Proposed Final Draft, 1997). (Erron. cit. as
Restatement of the Law, Torts.) A motorist who was injured in a collision with a
rig consisting of a tractor and two trailers, one of which had come unhitched,
sued the driver of the rig and the driver's employer. Defendants then filed a
third-party complaint against the corporation that had purchased the assets of the
manufacturer of the rig's hitch pin that allegedly failed. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the corporation. Reversing on other grounds, this court held,
inter alia, that the corporation could not be held liable on a negligence theory,
since there was no evidence that the danger was reasonably foreseeable. Corbin v.
Farmex, Inc., 227 Ga.App. 620, 490 S.E.2d 395, 399, reversed 269 Ga. 548, 501
S.E.2d 802 (1998), opinion vacated 506 S.E.2d 406 (Ga.App.1998).
Ga.App.2000. Cit. in case cit. in d i s c , cit. in case cit. but dist., cit. in
d i s c , subsecs. (b)(1) and (b)(2) cit. in ftn. Tea company's mechanic who injured
his hand while performing maintenance on a tea-bagging machine brought a
products-liability action against successors to the corporation that sold and was
responsible for servicing the machine, asserting a claim for negligent failure to
warn of a defect that became known to defendants after the machine was sold.
Affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendants, this court
held, inter alia, that, under Georgia law, there was no postsale duty to warn on
the part of either a product seller or its successor. Moreover, under Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 13, since plaintiff was aware of the risk
that resulted in his injuries, any breach of a duty to warn him could not have
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been the proximate cause of the injuries. DeLoach v. Rovema Corp., 241 Ga.App.
802, 527 S.E.2d 882, 883.
Ga.App.2001. Subsecs. (b)(1) and (b)(2) cit. in ftn. in sup. Worker who
sustained serious cuts to her hand when machine she was using malfunctioned
brought products-liability action against machine's manufacturer/seller. Trial
court granted defendant summary judgment. Reversing, this court held, inter alia,
that risk of injury to third person was foreseeable to defendant where defendant
knew that plaintiff's employer continued to use defective machine after it was
recalled. Smith v. Ontario Sewing Machine Co., Ltd., 249 Ga.App. 364, 369, 548
S.E.2d 89, 95, judgment vacated 259 Ga.App. 30, 576 S.E.2d 38 (2002).
Tex.2000. Cit. in disc. After two Marines were killed in a Navy helicopter
crash due to the failure of a bearing, victims' survivors brought a wrongful-death
suit against several corporations, including bearing manufacturer's successor,
alleging products liability and negligence. Trial court entered judgment on jury
verdict for plaintiffs. Appellate court affirmed in part. This court reversed in
part and remanded, holding, inter alia, that trial court erroneously instructed
jury on successor manufacturer's liability, because jury charge omitted elements
necessary to impose liability under plaintiffs' negligent-undertaking claim.
Although plaintiffs cited Restatement Third of Torts: Products Liability §§ 10-13,
the court did not decide whether those sections were consistent with Texas law.
Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 836.
Case Citations July 2004 through June 2005:
C.A.8, 2004. Com. (b) cit. in disc. Prison guard who suffered severe smoke
inhalation during a training exercise when a black smoke grenade was activated
brought a products-liability action against successor of company that manufactured
the grenade, alleging failure to warn against indoor use. District court granted
defendant summary judgment. This court reversed in part and remanded, holding,
inter alia, that an issue of fact remained as to whether defendant could be liable
for failure to place a warning on the grenade because a de facto merger occurred
between defendant and the manufacturer. Even if plaintiff could prove that
defendant benefited from the acquired company's customer lists, there was no
suggestion that defendant was aware of the grenade's labeling defect. Gamradt v.
Federal Laboratories, Inc., 380 F.3d 416, 421.
(1998)
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